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DON’T BE CRUEL (ANYMORE): A LOOK AT
THE ANIMAL CRUELTY REGIMES OF THE
UNITED STATES AND BRAZIL WITH A
CALL FOR A NEW ANIMAL
WELFARE AGENCY
DAVID N. CASSUTO *
CAYLEIGH ECKHARDT **
No man who has passed a month in the death cells believes in cages for
beasts.
—Ezra Pound (from the Pisan Cantos)
Abstract: In the United States and around the world, animals exploited for human use suffer cruel and needless harm. The group bearing the brunt of this exploitation—agricultural animals—is routinely exempted from the largely ineffective and rarely enforced animal welfare and anti-cruelty regulations that exist
today. This Article offers a comparative analysis of the agricultural animal welfare regimes of two countries with globally significant presence in the agriculture industry: the United States and Brazil. Even though the two countries approach agricultural animal welfare differently, they arrive at the same outcome:
institutionalized indifference to animal suffering. To remedy the current regulatory structure, this Article proposes the creation of an independent federal agency—The Animal Welfare Agency (“AWA”)—to regulate the safety and welfare
of all animals, including those used in agriculture. The AWA could significantly
reduce systemic animal cruelty in both the United States and Brazil and repre-
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sent an important step toward inserting morality and ethics into our relationships
with animals.

INTRODUCTION
Cruelty to animals is commonly defined as a malicious or criminally
negligent act that causes an animal to suffer pain or death. 1 Historically,
animal anti-cruelty statutes in the United States were enacted because, “[I]f
left to its own devices, society would exploit animals without regard to
moral or ethical consideration.” 2 Judging by the vast and increasing number
of exploited animals, these statutes have had little of the desired impact. 3
Over 9.1 billion land animals are killed in the United States for food each
year. 4 For most of them, their lives (and deaths) occur outside of the law’s
protection, with little thought given to their well-being. 5 In fact, many states
specifically exempt farm animals from anti-cruelty statutes. 6 This practice—excluding agricultural animals from anti-cruelty protections—is not
unique to the United States. Rather, it is the norm globally, and the resulting
animal suffering reaches an almost incomprehensible scale. 7
In an effort to understand the rationale behind excluding agricultural
animals from legal protections, this Article offers a comparative analysis of
1
Cruelty, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). States do vary in their codified definition of cruelty, but usually incorporate the concept of unnecessary, needless, or unjustified suffering into their definitions. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 272, § 77 (2015) (illegal to “inflict[] unnecessary cruelty upon [an animal], or unnecessarily fail[] to provide it with proper food, drink, shelter,
sanitary environment, or protection from the weather”); MISS. CODE. ANN. § 97-41-1 (2015)
(misdemeanor to “unjustifiably injure . . . or needlessly mutilate[] or kill[], any living creature”);
N.Y. AGRIC. & MKTS. LAW § 353 (McKinney 2015) (misdemeanor to “unjustifiably injure[],
maim[], mutilate[] or kill[] any animal”).
2
David J. Wolfson, Beyond the Law: Agribusiness and the Systemic Abuse of Animals Raised
for Food or Food Production, 2 ANIMAL L. 123, 148 (1996).
3
See Farm Animal Statistics: Slaughter Totals, HUMANE SOC’Y OF THE U.S., http://www.humane
society.org/news/resources/research/stats_slaughter_totals.html [http://perma.cc/M9XR-ZT2M] (last
updated June 25, 2015).
4
Id.
5
See Gaverick Matheny & Cheryl Leahy, Farm-Animal Welfare, Legislation, and Trade, 70
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 325, 326 (2007) (noting that excluding water animals from these figures is more a function of societal practice (and prejudice) than an acknowledgment that their
plight is any less dire, and that aquaculture as well as open water fishing are responsible for billions more deaths and unquantifiable suffering); David E. Solan, Et Tu Lisa Jackson? An Economic Case for Why the EPA’s Sweeping Environmental Regulatory Agenda Hurts Animal Welfare on
Factory Farms, 8 J. ANIMAL & NAT. RESOURCE L. 27, 34–36 (2012).
6
David J. Wolfson & Mariann Sullivan, Foxes in the Henhouse: Animals, Agribusiness and
the Law: A Modern American Fable, in ANIMAL RIGHTS: CURRENT DEBATES AND NEW DIRECTIONS 205, 207 (Cass R. Sunstein & Martha C. Nussbaum eds., 2004).
7
Stephanie J. Engelsman, “Word Leader” —At What Price? A Look at Lagging American
Animal Protection Law, 22 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 329, 332 (2005).
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two countries—Brazil and the United States. We selected these countries
because their respective animal agricultural regimes have global significance and impact, 8 and because their legal systems are dissimilar in approach but similar in result. Like the United States, Brazil exempts agricultural animals from legal protections afforded to other animals.9 However,
unlike the United States, Brazil’s Constitution explicitly recognizes a fundamental right of humane treatment for animals. 10 Still, Brazilian agricultural animals remain vulnerable to systemic abuse.11 This Article explores
why these two countries’ varying approaches to animal cruelty arrive at
substantially the same end. Profit clearly serves as a driving force in both
countries but does not necessarily explain the institutionalized indifference
to suffering. One can seek profit while still remaining sensitive to the impacts on others. There are many examples of entities that have done well
financially while remaining mindful of social responsibilities. 12
8
See David N. Cassuto & Sarah Saville, Hot, Crowded, and Legal: A Look at Industrial Agriculture in the United States and Brazil, 18 ANIMAL L. 185, 195, 201 (2012). The United States
has only five percent of the world’s population yet consumes fifteen percent of the world’s animals. Id. at 195. It is also the place where industrial agriculture began. Id. at 191. Brazil is one of
the world’s leading exporters of cattle and chicken and one of the largest live exporters, as well.
Id. at 200. “From 1995–2010, Brazil’s cattle herd increased 27%, national beef production increased 38%, and the county’s exports jumped by 731%.” Id. at 201.
9
Id. at 202–03; see DIRECTORATE GEN. FOR HEALTH & CONSUMER PROT., EUROPEAN
COMM’N, ANIMAL WELFARE 1 (2007), http://ec.europa.eu/food/animals/docs/aw_efsa_opinions_
factsheet_farmed03-2007_en.pdf [http://perma.cc/529N-5C7P]; infra notes 146–178 and accompanying text (noting that Brazil’s regulations pertaining to animals used in agriculture conform to
European Union standards, which are more rigorous than those of the United States). See generally WORLD BANK, WORLD DEVELOPMENT INDICATORS: 2011 (2011), http://siteresources.world
bank.org/DATASTATISTICS/Resources/wdi_ebook.pdf [https://perma.cc/7YQY-LYBN] (providing statistical information about world development indicators, showing differences in development and quality of life around the world).
10
See CONSTITUIÇÃO FEDERAL [C.F.] [CONSTITUTION] art. 225 (Braz.) (stating that the federal government must “protect the fauna and flora . . . [from] practices that endanger their ecological function, cause the extinction of species or subject animals to cruelty”) (trans.) (emphasis
added).
11
Tagore Trajano de Almeida Silva, Brazilian Animal Law Overview: Balancing Human and
Non-Human Interests, 6 J. ANIMAL L. 81, 86 (2010) (stating that laboratory animals also exist in a
form of legal limbo: on the one hand, they have constitutional protections, on the other, the law
permits their use and exploitation); see Raul Gallegos, Beagle Brutality Sets Off Brazil, BLOOMBERG VIEW (Oct. 31, 2013, 8:18 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-10-31/beaglebrutality-sets-off-brazil-.html [http://perma.cc/N8CK-B97A] (noting that in October 2013, Brazilian animal-rights activists broke into a laboratory and freed 178 beagles to both rescue the animals
and communicate their desire to ban laboratory animal testing); Chesney Hearst, Animal Cruelty
Debate Continues: Daily, RIO TIMES (Oct. 27, 2013), http://riotimesonline.com/brazil-news/riopolitics/animal-cruelty-debate-continues/# [http://perma.cc/D3N2-LYDQ].
12
See, e.g., Brad Tuttle, Chipotle Pulls Pulled Pork from 600 of Its Restaurants, TIME (Jan. 14,
2015), http://time.com/money/3667333/chipotle-pork-carnitas-shortage/ [http://perma.cc/BBL3AZHN]; Animal Welfare Standards, WHOLE FOODS MKT., http://www.wholefoodsmarket.com/
about-our-products/quality-standards/animal-welfare-standards [http://perma.cc/9L7K-X43D]; Whole
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Part I of this Article provides an overview of the regulatory regimes of
the two countries with respect to agricultural animals. 13 Although each has
laws mandating “humane treatment,” the scope and nature of that term leave
much to interpretation. In the United States, for example, the principal federal statute supposedly guaranteeing humane treatment is the Federal Meat
Inspection Act (“FMIA”), a law whose very title indicates that (living) animal protection is not the priority. 14 Brazil’s laws are similarly riven with
internal contradiction. 15
Part II explores the countries’ across-the-board exemptions for agricultural animals in almost all animal cruelty legislation or regulation.16 Part III
examines how political pressure from the agricultural industry, consumer
demand, and laws aimed at incentivizing the production of animal products
rather than maximizing animal welfare have resulted in subsidies (in the
United States), favorable regulatory structures (in both countries), and a
proliferation of inhumane practices. 17
Finally, Part IV offers a potential solution to the entrenchment of agricultural practices that fail to adequately account for animal welfare in both
the United States and Brazil. 18 There must be a new regulatory body devoted to the conditions of animals. Specifically, we call for the creation of a
federal agency—The Animal Welfare Agency (“AWA”)—to regulate animal
safety and welfare.19 The AWA would assume responsibility for animal welfare from existing regulatory bodies, thereby removing the potential for
agency capture and conflict. 20 The agency would have jurisdiction over all
animal welfare. However, because the majority of animals and animal mistreatment occurs in agriculture, the focus here is on agricultural animals. 21

Foods Begins Animal Welfare Labeling, HOARD’S DAIRYMAN (Mar. 30, 2011), http://www.hoards.
com/blog_whole_foods [http://perma.cc/X3JZ-6UQR]; Why Did Chipotle Stop Serving Carnitas?,
CHIPOTLE.COM, http://chipotle.com/carnitas [http://perma.cc/H98Y-BZGJ] (explaining that Chipotle
stopped serving carnitas in many restaurants because a supplier violated some of Chipotle’s animal
welfare standards).
13
See infra notes 26–178 and accompanying text.
14
Federal Meat Inspection Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 601–695 (2012); see also Humane Methods of
Slaughter Act, 7 U.S.C. §§ 1901–1902 (2012) (regulated by the Department of Agriculture); Animal Welfare Act, 7 U.S.C. §§ 2131–2159; Twenty Eight Hour Law, 49 U.S.C. § 80502 (2012)
(protecting animals during transportation to slaughter); Cassuto & Saville, supra note 8, at 203.
15
See Lei No. 9.605, de 12 de Fevereiro de 1998, DIÁRIO OFICIAL DA UNIÃO [D.O.U.] de
13.2.1998 (Braz.).
16
See infra notes 179–212 and accompanying text.
17
See infra notes 213–264 and accompanying text.
18
See infra notes 266–326 and accompanying text.
19
See infra notes 269–326 and accompanying text.
20
See infra notes 273–285, 298–315 and accompanying text.
21
See infra notes 286–294, 316–317 and accompanying text.
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We further demonstrate how an AWA could be successfully established in
Brazil and the United States. 22
The Article concludes with a brief discussion of the potential improvements in animal welfare, worker and food safety, and environmental
protection offered by our proposed Agency. 23 Realpolitik and powerful economic interests guarantee that this proposal will face a difficult road, and
require a great deal of political courage and will. However, the degree of
difficulty is dwarfed by the necessity for action. Billions of animals die in
horrible agony every year in the United States and Brazil. 24 Considering the
economic and political power the agricultural industry possesses in both
countries, a suggestion to ban industrialized agricultural production is not
workable. 25 The purpose of this Article is to offer ideas for improving animal welfare based on current realities. The present regulatory structure is
irremediably flawed; it is time for a new start.
I. LEGAL TREATMENT OF ANIMALS IN THE AGRICULTURAL INDUSTRY
Both Brazil and the United States recognize the need for laws protecting animals from cruelty. 26 These laws vary in scope from region to region. 27 However, neither country provides adequate protection for animals
within the agricultural industry. Because agricultural animals are viewed as
food, and food is necessary for life, the suffering of animals raised for food
has traditionally been viewed as unavoidable.28
This notion of necessity contains an embedded and ironic double
standard. Anti-cruelty laws, even applied to agricultural animals, usually
outlaw the infliction of “unnecessary” suffering. 29 Necessity, as a legal concept, is typically defined from the perspective of the potential victim; for
22

See infra notes 269–326 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 318–326 and accompanying text.
24
See supra notes 4–7 and accompanying text (noting that billions of animals suffer and die
for food in the United States); infra notes 170–178 and accompanying text (describing how the
hundreds of thousands of cattle killed annually for food in Brazil suffer terribly).
25
See infra notes 213–264 and accompanying text.
26
See, e.g., CONSTITUIÇÃO FEDERAL [C.F.] [CONSTITUTION] art. 225 (Braz.); Animal Welfare Act, 7 U.S.C. §§ 2131–2159 (2012).
27
See Constituição Federal [C.F.] [Constitution] art. 225 (Braz.); 7 U.S.C. §§ 2131–2159;
infra notes 46–105 and accompanying text.
28
Wolfson, supra note 2, at 148. See generally David N. Cassuto, Meat Animals, Humane
Standards and Other Legal Fictions, LAW, CULTURE & HUMAN. (forthcoming), http://digital
commons.pace.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1874&context=lawfaculty [perma.cc/LJZ8-83L9]
(detailing how supposedly humane federal practices ignore the brutal treatment of “food animals”).
29
See Frida Lundmark et al., ‘Unnecessary Suffering’ as a Concept in Animal Welfare Legislation and Standards, in THE ETHICS OF CONSUMPTION: THE CITIZEN, THE MARKET AND THE
LAW 114, 114–15 (H. Rocklinsberg & P. Sandin eds., 2013).
23
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example, one can kill in self-defense when it is necessary to avoid deadly
harm to oneself. 30 In that instance, the victim of an attack can inflict suffering upon her attacker to avoid a potentially worse outcome (her own death).
The law recognizes that the death of the attacker is preferable to the death
of the victim.
That relationship between potential victim and legal necessity is inverted in the case of animal cruelty. For example, no one would argue that it
is necessary for a calf to be castrated in order for that calf to avoid a worse
fate. Rather, the business interests of the human owner of the calf—the entity inflicting the suffering—take precedence over the calf’s well-being and
bodily integrity. Thus, because it is more profitable for the calf’s owner to
remove the calf’s testicles (rendering it more docile and therefore more
manageable), it becomes justifiable and legally “necessary” to castrate the
calf. 31
There are several discrete but linked ideas within this rationale that diverge from the standard logic of cruelty, necessity, and common sense.
First, as mentioned, necessity is judged not from the perspective of the victim but rather that of the instigator of the suffering. 32 This raises a jurisprudential question: if an animal’s suffering is irrelevant to the determination of
necessity, can the animal enduring cruelty legitimately be classified as a
victim? 33 This question leads one to then inquire whether legitimate victims
can actually exist under animal cruelty statutes. 34
Second, the idea of necessity in the animal cruelty context revolves
around economics. 35 For instance, debeaking chickens or docking the tails
of pigs or dairy cattle makes it easier to confine the animals in very close
30

See, e.g., LA. STAT. ANN. § 14:20 (2015) (stating that homicide is justifiable when committed in self-defense); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 35.15 (McKinney 2015) (describing that a person may
use deadly physical force for self-defense against another that he believes will use deadly force
upon him).
31
GARY FRANCIONE, ANIMALS, PROPERTY, AND THE LAW 26 (1995) (noting that no anesthesia
is used when carrying out the procedure). See generally AM. VETERINARY MED. ASS’N, LITERATURE
REVIEW ON THE WELFARE IMPLICATIONS OF CASTRATION OF CATTLE (2014), https://www.
avma.org/KB/Resources/LiteratureReviews/Documents/castration-cattle-bgnd.pdf
[http://perma.
cc/79JT-K85B] (explaining the current lack of use of anesthesia in the castration procedure while
advocating for the benefits of using anesthesia to minimize the animal’s pain and stress associated
with the castration process).
32
FRANCIONE, supra note 31, at 26.
33
See generally Luis E. Chiesa, Why Is It a Crime to Stomp on a Goldfish?—Harm, Victimhood and the Structure of Anti-Cruelty Offenses, 78 MISS. L.J. 1 (2008) (arguing that society has
decided to criminalize harm to animals primarily out of concern for the well-being of such creatures, not because doing so furthers some other human interest).
34
See id. at 34 (explaining that though widely misperceived, cruelty laws are in fact meant to
protect animal victims).
35
See FRANCIONE, supra note 31, at 26.
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quarters. 36 The industry maintains that these procedures, which result in
lasting pain and discomfort for the animals, nevertheless increase the yield
of animal products. 37 In the eyes of the law, that economic benefit translates
into “necessity.”
In no other context with which the authors are familiar does profit determine whether the infliction of suffering is legally necessary. Nonetheless,
as animal agriculture has industrialized, economic gain has become ever
more determinative of animal welfare. 38 Furthermore, as has been widely
discussed, modern agricultural practices differ significantly from those of
small farms of the past, both in the systematization and the sheer scale of
the suffering they inflict. 39 This section provides an overview of the treatment of agricultural animals in the United States and Brazil.40
A. Regulation in the United States
In the United States, the few federal animal protection laws that exist
deal primarily with transport and slaughterhouse protocols. 41 The rest is left
to the states. 42 Unfortunately, most states exempt “common” or “normal”

36

DAVID FAVRE, ANIMAL LAW: WELFARE, INTERESTS, AND RIGHTS 293 (2008).
See generally Gulnaz Shaheen, Factory Farming: A Cruel Practice, 3 AYER 91 (2015)
(explaining the cruelty present in farming operations).
38
Michael Pollan, Farmer in Chief, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 9, 2008), http://www.nytimes.com/
2008/10/12/magazine/12policy-t.html?rref=collection%2Ftimestopic%2FPollan%2C%20Michael
&action=click&contentCollection=timestopics&region=stream&module=stream_unit&version=la
test&contentPlacement=37&pgtype=collection. See generally David N. Cassuto, Owning What
You Eat: The Discourse of Food, 4 REVISTA BRASILERIA DE DIREITO ANIMAL 45 (2009) (explaining that industrial agriculture has refashioned animal husbandry into a mechanized process
that ignores historic methods of human/nonhuman animal interaction).
39
Elizabeth A. Overcash, Comment, Unwarranted Discrepancies in the Advancement of
Animal Law: The Growing Disparity in Protection Between Companion Animals and Agricultural
Animals, 90 N.C. L. REV. 837, 875–76 (2012). See generally Joyce D’Silva, Adverse Impact of
Industrial Animal Agriculture on the Health and Welfare of Farmed Animals, 1 INTEGRATIVE
ZOOLOGY 53 (2006) (explaining how maximizing productivity has been the driving force in the
increasingly intensive nature of the farming of animals, and has resulted in serious threats to the
health and welfare of the animals involved); JOYCE D’SILVA & PETER STEVENSON, COMPASSION
IN WORLD FARMING TR., MODERN BREEDING TECHNOLOGIES AND WELFARE OF FARM ANIMALS
(1995), https://www.ciwf.org.uk/media/3816969/modern-breeding-technologies-and-farm-animalwelfare.pdf [http:perma.cc/2UMT-STBR] (discussing how modern methods of breeding are
threatening farm animal health and welfare).
40
See infra notes 41–178 and accompanying text.
41
See infra notes 45–73 and accompanying text.
42
See GARY L. FRANCIONE, INTRODUCTION TO ANIMAL RIGHTS: YOUR CHILD OR THE DOG?
56–58 (2000) (explaining the protocols in states including California, Delaware, Kentucky, Maryland, Nebraska, Oregon, and Pennsylvania).
37
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farming practices from their anti-cruelty statutes. 43 Consequently, agricultural animals have little or no legal protection from inhumane treatment.44
1. Federal Law
No federal regulations or statutes “govern the way that [agricultural]
animals are treated from the time that they are born or hatched to the time
they are sent off to be slaughtered.” 45 The few federal laws that do exist
focus on the animals’ transport, slaughter, or condition immediately prior to
slaughter, not on the nature of their pre-transport existence. 46
The Humane Methods of Slaughter Act (“HMSA”) is overseen by the
Department of Agriculture (“USDA”). 47 The statute charges the agency
with regulating the kill methods used in federally approved slaughterhouses. 48 However, the USDA has determined that the HMSA excludes both
birds and fish, 49even as birds and fish account for roughly ninety-nine percent of farmed animals. 50 Thus, the few protections offered by the HMSA
apply only to the land mammals that comprise the remaining one percent of
domestically slaughtered animals. 51 The HMSA is even further limited because it exempts ritual slaughter. 52

43
See COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-9-201.5 (2015); IDAHO CODE § 25-3514(5) (2015); 510 ILL.
COMP. STAT. 70/13 (2015); IOWA CODE § 717.2(1)(a), (c) (2015); MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-8211(4)(b) (2015); NEV. REV. STAT. § 574.200 (2015); see also Wolfson, supra note 2, at 127–32.
44
See infra notes 45–122 and accompanying text (describing the inadequacy of federal and
state laws in protecting agricultural animals).
45
Cheryl L. Leahy, Large-Scale Farmed Animal Abuse and Neglect: Law and Its Enforcement, 4 J. ANIMAL L. & ETHICS 63, 75 (2011); see Humane Methods of Slaughter Act, 7 U.S.C.
§§ 1901–1907 (2012) (governing animal treatment only as it relates to methods of slaughter); PEW
COMM’N ON INDUS. FARM ANIMAL PROD., PUTTING MEAT ON THE TABLE: INDUSTRIAL FARM
ANIMAL PRODUCTION IN AMERICA 30 (2008); see also Animal Welfare Act, 7 U.S.C. §§ 2131–
2159 (only regulating the welfare of animals being used for research, which does not include agricultural animals); Twenty Eight Hour Law, 49 U.S.C. § 80502 (2012) (requiring minimum standards of care for animals during transportation).
46
See 7 U.S.C. §§ 1901–1907, 2131–2159; 49 U.S.C. § 80502.
47
7 U.S.C. §§ 1901–1902.
48
Id.
49
Id.; see also 9 C.F.R. § 301.2 (2015) (defining livestock as “[c]attle, sheep, swine, goat,
horse, mule, or other equine”).
50
Matheny & Leahy, supra note 5, at 326.
51
Rachel Wechsler, Blood on the Hands of the Federal Government: Affirmative Steps That
Promote Animal Cruelty, 4 J. ANIMAL L. & ETHICS 183, 200–01 (2011).
52
7 U.S.C. § 1902(b) (defining humane slaughter to include “slaughtering in accordance with
the ritual requirements of the Jewish faith or any other religious faith that prescribes a method of
slaughter whereby the animal suffers loss of consciousness by anemia of the brain caused by the
simultaneous and instantaneous severance of the carotid arteries with a sharp instrument and handling in connection with such slaughtering”).
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In addition, the regulations designed to reduce suffering during slaughter are largely ineffectual.53 For example, though the HMSA requires that
animals be rendered senseless prior to their being hoisted, shackled, and cut,
many receive inaccurate stun blows. 54 As a result, these poorly stunned animals are often skinned alive. 55 Therefore, even the small percentage of animals supposedly protected under the HMSA can still suffer during slaughter. 56
The second of the two principal federal laws governing the treatment
of agricultural animals is the FMIA, which pertains to animals once they
reach the slaughterhouse. 57 The FMIA mandates that these animals be treated humanely only during the slaughter process. 58 Yet, the FMIA still allows
animals who are injured and already suffering to be slaughtered, thus creating a perverse incentive to mistreat animals prior to their arrival (mistreatment is usually less expensive than humane treatment).59
In 2012, the United States Supreme Court ruled that Section 599 of the
California Penal Code, which was amended to provide more slaughterhouse
protections, was preempted by the FMIA. 60 In finding that the FMIA’s animal welfare standards preempted state law, Justice Kagan references “humane” treatment only as it relates to slaughterhouses. 61 Such a narrow perspective excludes most of the animals’ lives and, therefore, much of the
cruelty they endure.
A third relevant federal law, Section 80502 of Title 49 of the United
States Code, known as the “Twenty-Eight Hour Law,” ostensibly provides
protection for animals during transport to slaughter. 62 It requires that livestock transported by a common carrier vehicle for over twenty-eight con-

53

Leahy, supra note 45, at 75–76.
See 7 U.S.C. § 1902(a); Cassuto, supra note 28, at 4.
55
Cassuto, supra note 28, at 4 (“[T]he rapidity of the modern industrial kill line ensures that
there will inevitably be some inaccurate stun blows. That means that some percentage (even 0.5%
still amounts to thousands of animals) is not properly stunned. Those poorly stunned animals are
often skinned alive.”).
56
See 7 U.S.C. § 1902(a); Cassuto, supra note 28, at 4.
57
21 U.S.C. §§ 601–695 (2012).
58
Id. The FMIA allows animals who, after arrival at the slaughterhouse, are seriously injured
to be butchered and sold for human consumption. Cassuto, supra note 28, at 6. Therefore, there is
“little disincentive for industrial meat producers and their transporters to invest in the animals’
wellbeing.” Id.
59
Cassuto, supra note 28, at 6; Matheny & Leahy, supra note 5, at 327–29, 346 tbl.3.
60
See 21 U.S.C. § 678; Nat’l Meat Ass’n v. Harris, 132 S. Ct. 965, 968, 970–71 (2012) (holding that the FMIA explicitly prohibits state-imposed animal handling requirements that are “in
addition to, or different than those made under this [Act]”).
61
See Nat’l Meat Ass’n, 132 S. Ct. at 968; Cassuto, supra note 28, at 3–4.
62
See 49 U.S.C. § 80502 (2012).
54
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secutive hours have at least five hours of rest as well as food and water.63
This law—which also excludes birds—fails in its application. 64 Not only do
the regulations allow birds to be confined indefinitely, 65 but the law’s very
title reveals a marked indifference to all other animals’ well-being. If nonavian animals cannot be confined for more than twenty-eight hours, that
means that they can be confined for up to twenty-eight hours without food,
water, or space to move. 66 Clearly, a law permitting such treatment has very
little to do with actually safeguarding animal welfare.67
In addition, as with the HMSA, the Twenty-Eight Hour Law is riddled
with exemptions. 68 For example, “Sheep may be confined an additional
eight consecutive hours without being unloaded when the twenty-eight-hour
period of confinement ends at night.” 69 Because the owner has a vested interest in the animals reaching market as soon as possible, there is a clear
incentive to ignore the animals’ comfort in favor of speeding up their
transport. Moreover, even putting aside its exemptions, the Twenty-Eight
Hour Law is ineffective in practice because it is rarely enforced. 70 The last
known enforcement action dates back to 1960. 71 Finally, even if the law
were properly enforced (or enforced at all), its maximum penalty is $500
per shipment. 72 Offenders could easily absorb such fines as the cost of doing business. 73
2. State Laws
State laws offer little more protection than the federal statutes.74 While
all states in the United States have anti-cruelty laws, agricultural animals
remain largely unprotected because they are explicitly exempted from the
63

Id.; see also Leahy, supra note 45, at 76.
See 9 C.F.R. § 89.1 (2015) (defining requirements under the Twenty Eight Hour Law;
omitting categories for treatment for birds); see also Matheny & Leahy, supra note 5, at 335.
65
See 9 C.F.R. § 89.1. Because the regulations do not apply to birds, holding birds for a period longer than twenty-eight hours will not violate the law. See id.
66
See generally, 49 U.S.C. § 80502.
67
Cassuto, supra note 28, at 7–8.
68
See 49 U.S.C. § 80502(a)(2).
69
Id.
70
See Matheny & Leahy, supra note 5, at 334–36.
71
See 49 U.S.C. § 80502(a)(2); S. Pac. Transp. Co. v. Comm’r, 75 T.C. 497, 502, 643, 654
(1980) (referencing Twenty Eight Hour Act violations committed in 1960 and 1961); Matheny &
Leahy, supra note 5, at 335; see also Cassuto & Saville, supra note 8, at 199.
72
See 49 U.S.C. § 80502(d) (providing for a civil penalty of “at least $100 but not more than
$500 for each violation”).
73
Cassuto, supra note 28, at 8; see also Robyn Mallon, The Deplorable Standard of Living
Faced by Farm Animals in America’s Meat Industry and How to Improve Conditions by Eliminating the Corporate Farm, 9 MICH. ST. UNIV. J. MED. & L. 389, 399 (2005).
74
See infra notes 75–122 and accompanying text.
64
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laws’ respective ambits. 75 The statutes are drafted in such a way as to make
common (and cruel) agricultural practices acceptable, make enforcing the
law impracticable, and render offenders immune from prosecution. 76
Traditionally, domestic animals were viewed as property to be used as
the owner saw fit. 77 However, when animals gained economic value, they
acquired some limited legal protections, as well. 78 Today, that relationship is
inverted. Animals that were historically unprotected, such as domestic pets,
have more legal protection than commoditized animals.79 Companion animals enjoy more protection than other animals because of their special relationship with humans. 80 Farm animals, on the other hand, are generally exempted from anti-cruelty laws because they are viewed as an instrument of
production and a means to human ends. The laws are predicated on the notion that “it would harm a human being to observe or [have] knowledge [of]
the infliction of harm on a companion animal, while it may not harm them
if pain were inflicted on an animal they solely use as a means to an end.” 81
This attitude underlies a commonly held notion that anti-cruelty laws are
less concerned with protecting animals than with the morality and well-

75

See, e.g., S.C. CODE ANN. § 47-1-40(C) (2015) (providing that the statute does not apply to
fowl and “accepted animal husbandry practices of farm operations”).
76
See COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-9-201.5 (2015) (stating that the act shall not affect accepted
husbandry practices); IDAHO CODE § 25-3514(5) (2015) (providing that the statute shall not interfere with normal or accepted practices of animal husbandry); MO. REV. STAT. § 578.007(8) (2015)
(stating that the act shall not apply to “normal or accepted practices of animal husbandry”); see
also Wolfson, supra note 2, at 123 (explaining that twenty-eight states have enacted laws that
create a legal realm whereby certain acts, no matter how cruel, are outside the reach of anti-cruelty
statutes as long as the acts are deemed “accepted,” “common,” “customary,” or “normal” farming
practices). See generally Christopher A. Pierce, Detailed Discussion of Humane Societies and
Enforcement Powers, MICH. ST. U. ANIMAL LEGAL & HISTORICAL CTR. (2011), https://www.animal
law.info/article/detailed-discussion-humane-societies-and-enforcement-powers
[http://perma.cc/
93VW-34VV] (describing how some states delegate enforcement authority to humane societies
because of difficulties in traditional enforcement).
77
Wolfson, supra note 2, at 127 (owners of domesticated animals were free to treat animals
as they wished and dispose of them as they wished).
78
DAVID FAVRE & MURRAY LORING, ANIMAL LAW 122 (1983) (explaining how domesticated animals that were valuable in economic terms gained statutory protections against their theft
and destruction); Wolfson, supra note 2, at 127 (“Only when animals gained economic value did
the law prohibit the interference with such animals by someone other than the owner.”).
79
FAVRE & LORING, supra note 78, at 122; Wolfson, supra note 2, at 127.
80
Paige M. Tomaselli, Detailed Discussion of International Comparative Animal Cruelty Laws,
MICH. ST. U. ANIMAL LEGAL & HISTORICAL CTR. (2003), https://www.animallaw.info/article/
detailed-discussion-international-comparative-animal-cruelty-laws [http://perma.cc/XTJ6-RXAT].
81
Id. (internal quotations omitted).
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being of humans. 82 The idea that humans form the focus of anti-cruelty laws
has found its way into the jurisprudence, as well. 83
a. Statutory Construction
As noted, many states explicitly exempt agricultural animals from cruelty protections. Thirty-seven states exempt “common” or “normal” farming
practices from legal scrutiny. 84 Thus, no matter how cruel a practice might
be, if commonly done, it becomes legally permissible. 85 Other states, like
Iowa and Utah, exclude livestock from the statutory definition of “animal,”
leaving them with virtually no protection at all.86
Allowing the regulated community to base what is and is not permissible on industry practice goes beyond self-regulation; it points to a regulatory matrix devoid of any real function. 87 In this void, the commonality of a
practice, rather than any normative analysis, becomes the barometer of acceptability. Commentators David Wolfson and Mariann Sullivan liken this
approach to the fox guarding the henhouse. 88 Professor J.B. Ruhl—referring
to a similar indifference to the industry’s environmental impacts—calls it
“the vast ‘anti-law’ of farms and the environment.” 89
82

See id.
See People v. Garcia, 812 N.Y.S.2d 66, 73 (2006) (concluding that killing goldfish in front
of a small child amounts to aggravated cruelty because of the distress caused to the child); Chiesa,
supra note 33, at 1.
84
Cody Carlson, How State Ag-Gag Laws Could Stop Animal-Cruelty Whistleblowers, ATLANTIC (Mar. 25, 2013), http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2013/03/how-state-ag-gaglaws-could-stop-animal-cruelty-whistleblowers/273962/ [http://perma.cc/3LT5-BYVK].
85
See Wolfson, supra note 2, at 136.
86
IOWA CODE § 717B.1(1)(a) (2015) (stating that “‘animal’ does not include . . . [l]ivestock”);
UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-9-301(1)(b)(ii) (West 2015) (stating that “‘[a]nimal’ does not include . . .
[l]ivestock”).
87
See COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-9-201.5 (2015) (“Nothing in this part . . . shall affect accepted
animal husbandry practices . . . .”); IDAHO CODE § 25-3514 (2015) (“No part of this chapter shall
be construed as interfering with . . . [n]ormal or accepted practices of animal identification and
animal husbandry as established by, but not limited to, guidelines developed and approved by the
appropriate national or state commodity organizations . . . .”); 510 ILL. COMP. STAT. 70/13 (2015)
(“Nothing in this Act affects normal, good husbandry practices utilized by any person in the production of food, companion or work animals . . . .”); IOWA CODE § 717.2(1) (livestock neglect
does not include conduct consistent with “customary animal husbandry practices”); MONT. CODE
ANN. § 45-8-211(4) (2015) (“This section does not prohibit . . . the use of commonly accepted
agricultural and livestock practices on livestock . . . .”); NEV. REV. STAT. § 574.200 (2015)
(“The[se] provisions . . . do not . . . [p]rohibit or interfere with established methods of animal
husbandry, including the raising, handling, feeding, housing and transporting of livestock or farm
animals.”); see also Wolfson, supra note 2, at 127–32; Wolfson & Sullivan, supra note 6, at 207.
88
Wolfson & Sullivan, supra note 6, at 207.
89
J.B. Ruhl, Farms, Their Environmental Harms, and Environmental Law, 27 ECOLOGY L.Q.
263, 267 (2000).
83
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Another way states limit protections for agricultural animals is through
a seemingly deliberate lack of clarity in defining the nature of any purported
offense. 90 Poor draftsmanship and vague terminology leave courts with
broad discretion to determine if and how farm animals fall within the law’s
scope. 91 In addition, even statutes that cover agricultural animals frequently
exclude requirements regarding their basic needs. 92 These omissions include minimum requirements for adequate exercise, space, light, ventilation, and clean living conditions. 93
b. Enforcement
Aside from the myriad of exemptions and exclusions embedded in
state laws, practical enforcement issues further hinder farm animal protections. 94 For example, if a statute has a mens rea requirement and an industrial facility houses hundreds of thousands of animals, it becomes very difficult to prove that the neglect and consequent suffering of specific animals
in the facility was deliberate rather than the result of ignorance or simple
negligence. 95 Furthermore, resources for prosecuting crimes against animals
often disappear in the face of relentless pressure to prioritize crimes against
human victims. 96 This budget squeeze presents additional difficulties be-

90

Wolfson & Sullivan, supra note 6, at 207–14.
Wolfson, supra note 2, at 131; see, e.g., State v. Stockton, 333 P.2d 735, 737 (Ariz. 1958)
(“Our conclusion is that the legislature did not express an intention to include birds or fowls within . . . the term ‘an animal.’”); State v. Buford, 331 P.2d 1110, 1115 (N.M. 1958) (“The language
of the statute, however, seems to apply only to brute creatures and work animals.”); Lock v.
Falkenstine, 380 P.2d 278, 283 (Okla. Crim. App. 1963) (“[T]he Oklahoma Statute makes no
attempt to define animals, yet the legislature has described the species that come under certain
provisions; and the Court is at a loss to ascertain why that was not done in the Statute before us.”).
92
See VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 382 (2015) (transportation statute allowing transport without
food, water, and rest for up to eighteen hours); WIS. STAT. § 951.14 (2013–2014) (requiring provision of proper shelter, but does not require provisions any more stringent than normally accepted
husbandry practices). Light is only a requirement in a few state statutes, and only Maine and Wisconsin refer to clean living conditions in their statutes. ANIMAL WELFARE INST., ANIMALS AND
THEIR LEGAL RIGHTS: A SUMMARY OF AMERICAN LAWS FROM 1641–1990, at 10 (1990) (citing
ME. STAT. tit. 7, § 4011 (2015)).
93
Wolfson, supra note 2, at 131 (citing ANIMAL WELFARE INST., supra note 92, at 10); ME.
STAT. tit. 7, § 4011 (describing how in Maine, it is unlawful to “[d]eprive an animal that the person owns or possesses of necessary sustenance, necessary medical attention, proper shelter, protection from the weather or humanely clean conditions”).
94
See infra notes 95–106 and accompanying text.
95
See Wolfson, supra note 2, at 131 (noting that “many state statutes require that the prosecution demonstrate a mental state of the defendant that may be hard to prove”).
96
Id. (citing and quoting Steven Wise, Of Farm Animals and Justice, 3 PACE ENVTL. L. REV.
191, 206 (1986)) (‘“[T]he enforcement of these criminal statutes is typically left to a public prosecutorial agency, itself overwhelmed by human problems, or to an overburdened private Society for
91

14

Environmental Affairs

[Vol. 43:1

cause state anti-cruelty laws provide no standing for private parties.97 Thus,
if the state declines to prosecute a violation, there is no other recourse.
Moreover, even if a state were to enforce its anti-cruelty policies, police officers may lack the training and expertise to identify crimes and enforce the laws. 98 Several states delegate police powers to humane societies
and their agents. 99 For example, in New York, the American Society for the
Prevention of Cruelty to Animals has broad authority to investigate and enforce animal cruelty violations.100 Sometimes, delegation of enforcement
authority involves specialized individuals endorsed by humane societies
who work alongside police officers. 101 On the other end of the spectrum,
humane society agents may be granted all enforcement authority, essentially
resulting in the deputization of humane society employees. 102 Relegating
animal protection to the purview of non-governmental organizations undermines the status of the endeavor and leaves it to the mercy of privately
funded organizations. 103
It also bears mentioning that because farming practices largely take
place on private property, law enforcement is hindered because of the difficulty of establishing the required probable cause to enter the premises
where the alleged violation is taking place.104 Attaining probable cause often requires having a person on the inside documenting the criminal activi-

the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals (SPCA) or similar society, with no private enforcement
right.’”).
97
See generally William A. Reppy, Jr., Citizen Standing to Enforce Anti-Cruelty Laws by
Obtaining Injunctions: The North Carolina Experience, 11 ANIMAL L. 39 (2005) (describing how
North Carolina is the only state that authorizes citizen standing for the enforcement of anti-cruelty
laws); Kristen Stuber Snyder, Note, No Cracks in the Wall: The Standing Barrier and the Need for
Restructuring Animal Protection Laws, 57 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 137 (2009) (discussing the difficulties of establishing standing in animal welfare cases).
98
See Pierce, supra note 76. See generally Resources for Law Enforcement, HUMANE SOC’Y
OF THE U.S., http://www.humanesociety.org/issues/abuse_neglect/resources_law_enforcement.html
[http://perma.cc/NJ72-E9D7] (discussing that law enforcement agencies across the country call
upon the Animal Rescue Team to assist with the investigation and prosecution of animal abuse).
99
Pierce, supra note 76.
100
N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 2.10(7) (McKinney 2015).
101
See Pierce, supra note 76.
102
Id. (detailing how California approves humane officers, giving them nearly all the powers
of a police officer, and may allow them to carry a firearm).
103
Wolfson, supra note 2, at 147 (“The delegation of power to the farming industry is breathtaking. It is difficult to imagine another non-governmental group possessing such influence over a
criminal legal definition. In effect, state legislators have granted agribusiness a ‘legal license’ to
treat farm animals as they wish.”).
104
Id. at 132 (“It is . . . extremely difficult to ascertain what occurs on the average farm, because a farm is private property.”).
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ty. 105 Yet, many states have criminalized the undercover operations that expose the animal abuse. 106
c. State Level Ag-Gag Legislation
Ag-gag laws “criminalize the recordings, possession, or distribution of
still images (photos), live images (video) and/or audio at or upon a farm,
industrial agricultural operation, or animal facility.” 107 In the 1980s, the
predecessors of ag-gag laws sought to prevent theft or injury to farmed animals. 108 However, in their contemporary form, these laws now prohibit the
production of unauthorized audio/visual recordings at agricultural facilities
and the possession and distribution of recordings. 109
While proponents of ag-gag legislation claim that such laws are necessary for the protection of agricultural enterprises against defamation and
misrepresentation, numerous organizations with focuses ranging from civil
liberties, public health, food safety, environmental, food justice, animal welfare, legal, workers’ rights, to free speech oppose ag-gag laws as a violation
of the First Amendment. 110 Ultimately, such laws bolster the ability of the
agricultural industry to keep inhumane practices behind closed doors, free
from the threat of prosecution or public opprobrium. 111
Existing laws such as trespass already criminalize much of the behavior criminalized by ag-gag laws. 112 However, ag-gag laws drastically in105

Id. (citing State v. Osborn, 409 N.E.2d 1077 (Ohio 1980)).
See id. (pointing to the significant trend within states to remove legal protection from animals raised for food or food production altogether).
107
ABIGAIL PERDUE & RANDALL LOCKWOOD, ANIMAL CRUELTY AND FREEDOM OF SPEECH:
WHEN WORLDS COLLIDE 232 (2014).
108
Sonci Kingery, Note, The Agricultural Iron Curtain: Ag Gag Legislation and the Threat to
Free Speech, Food Safety, and Animal Welfare, 17 DRAKE J. AGRIC. L. 645, 656 (2012) (stating
that “the Kansas law was less focused on undercover investigations and more concerned with
property damage and liberation or theft of animals”).
109
See, e.g., IOWA CODE § 717A.3A (2015); MONT. CODE ANN. § 81-30-103(2)(e) (2015);
UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-6-112(2)(a)–(d) (West 2015).
110
See Kathleen Masterson, Ag-Gag Law Blows Animal Activists’ Cover, NPR (Mar. 10,
2012), http://www.npr.org/2012/03/10/148363509/ag-gag-law-blows-animal-activists-cover [http://
perma.cc/T3G6-6883] (explaining how ag-gag laws can silence workers who see abuse and film
it, and in turn, infringe upon their right to free speech). See generally Kevin C. Adam, Note,
Shooting the Messenger: A Common-Sense Analysis of State “Ag-Gag” Legislation Under the
First Amendment, 45 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 1129 (2012) (discussing the inherent conflict between
ag-gag laws and First Amendment rights).
111
Mark Bittman, Who Protects the Animals?, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 26, 2011 9:29 PM), http://
www.opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/04/26/who-protects-the-animals [http://perma.cc/CZ6CJLPN].
112
Trespass, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (defining trespass as “[a]n unlawful
act committed against the . . . property of another” or “wrongful entry on another’s real property”).
106
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crease the severity of the penalties for such violations, based solely on the
media’s content and the actor’s intent. 113 As such, they raise serious constitutional questions. 114 A number of governors have vetoed ag-gag legislation
and several others are facing court challenges. 115
Ag-gag laws also present an interesting irony similar to the inversion
of necessity in animal cruelty laws. Just as animal cruelty laws define necessity in terms of the needs of the person inflicting the cruelty, ag-gag laws
are designed to protect those who inflict cruelty, while criminalizing those
who expose it. 116 Thus, victimized animals are completely ignored by the
legal system while those who victimize them receive the extensive protection. Under Idaho’s recently overturned ag-gag statute, for example, violations could have led to up to a year in jail and a $5,000 fine. 117 Yet, the
maximum jail time for a first violation of the state’s animal cruelty statute
was six months. 118 Thus, the law would have “punish[ed] those who expose
animal cruelty more severely than those who actually commit[ed] it.” 119
In sum, agricultural animals in the United States have almost no legal
protection from birth to slaughter. 120 Given this reality, the question becomes whether improved legislation would cure existing deficiencies and
provide adequate safeguards against inhumane agricultural practices. As the
ensuing discussion of Brazil’s legal regime makes clear, even impressive
113

See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 47-1827(c) (2014); MONT. CODE ANN. § 81-30-103.
See Adam, supra note 110, at 1169 (discussing how ag-gag laws are likely an unconstitutional content-based restriction on speech).
115
See, e.g., Civil Rights Complaint at 2, Animal Legal Def. Fund v. Herbert, No. 13-679 (D.
Utah filed July 22, 2013), http://www.mediapeta.com/peta/pdf/PETAALDFUtahAgGag
Complaint.pdf [http://perma.cc/8SVC-CHM2] (challenging Utah’s ag-gag law as unconstitutional,
claiming that it violates the Supremacy Clause and First and Fourteenth Amendments); Jessalee
Landfried, Note, Bound & Gagged: Potential First Amendment Challenges to “Ag-Gag” Laws, 23
DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 377, 391–401 (2013) (pointing out weaknesses in First Amendment
challenges to existing and proposed ag-gag laws); Samantha Lachman, North Carolina Gov. Pat
McCrory Defies GOP Legislature, Vetoes ‘Ag-Gag’ Bill, HUFFINGTON POST (May 29, 2015, 3:51
PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2015/05/29/pat-mccrory-ag-gag-_n_7471210.html [http://
perma.cc/5M7E-BEUS] (North Carolina Governor Pat McCrory vetoing ag-gag bill over concerns
that it could criminalize employees who report illegal activity); Andy Sher, Tennessee Governor Bill
Haslam Vetoing ‘Ag-gag’ Bill, TIMES FREE PRESS (May 13, 2013), http://www.timesfreepress.
com/news/local/story/2013/may/13/tennessee-governor-bill-haslam-vetoing-ag-gag-bill/107867/
[http://perma.cc/29L8-SAZT] (Tennessee Governor Bill Haslam vetoing ag-gag bill, citing First
Amendment concerns).
116
See Landfried, supra note 115, at 391.
117
See IDAHO CODE § 18-7042(1) (2015); Animal Legal Def. Fund v. Otter, No. 14-104,
2015 WL 4623943, at *3 (D. Idaho Aug. 3, 2015).
118
See IDAHO CODE § 25-3520A(1).
119
Civil Rights Complaint at ¶ 50, Animal Legal Def. Fund v. Otter, 44 F. Supp. 3d 1009 (D.
Idaho 2014) (No. 14-104), 2014 WL 1017045, at *1.
120
See supra notes 41–119 and accompanying text.
114
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legislation coupled with constitutional rights cannot overcome countervailing economic and social forces. 121 Therefore, more than simply stronger
laws are needed; the entire regulatory regime needs to be reformed. 122
B. Regulation in Brazil
Brazil’s animal welfare regime dates to 1924, when the federal government enacted Decree 16.560/1924, prohibiting the “carrying out of any
behavior or recreation that cause[s] suffering to animals.” 123 A decade later,
in 1934, then President Getulio Vargas promulgated Decree 24.645, which
prohibited:
[Maintaining] animals in anti-hygienic places or where they cannot breath properly, move or rest, or are deprived of light; . . .
abandon[ing] [an] animal that is ill, hurt, worn out or mutilated,
and also not giving to it everything that is possible, including veterinary assistance; . . . [or] not giving quickly death, without long
suffering, for an animal for which extermination is necessary for
consumption or not . . . . 124
The law also enabled lawyers from the Public Ministry, or attorneys from
animal protection organizations to assist animals in court. 125 This gives animals a form of standing in federal court that is wholly lacking in the United
States. 126 The Public Ministry or Public Prosecutor’s Office is considered a
fourth branch of the Brazilian government. 127 Completely autonomous and
separate from the legislative, judicial, and executive branches, its sole purpose is to oversee compliance with the law and defend national interests.128
121

See infra notes 123–178 and accompanying text.
See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
123
Decreto No. 16.560, de 16 de Agosto de 1924, DIÁRIO OFICIAL DA UNIÃO [D.O.U.] de
16.8.1924 (Braz.); Silva, supra note 11, at 83.
124
Brazil Federal Decree on Anti-Cruelty No. 24,645, MICH. ST. U. ANIMAL LEGAL &
HISTORICAL CTR., https://www.animallaw.info/administrative/br-federal-decree-anti-cruelty [http://
perma.cc/4VZS-T3P4] (providing a summary, in English, of Decree 25.645); see Decreto No.
24.645, de 10 de Julho de 1934, DIÁRIO OFICIAL DA UNIÃO [D.O.U.] de 10.07.1934 (Braz.);
Cassuto & Saville, supra note 8, at 202.
125
Decreto No. 25.645, de 10 de Julho de 1934, DIÁRIO OFICIAL DA UNIÃO [D.O.U.] de
10.07.1934 (Braz.).
126
Silva, supra note 11, at 83.
127
Lesley McAllister & Benjamin van Rooij, Environmental Challenges in Middle-Income
Countries: A Comparison of Enforcement in Brazil, China, Indonesia, and Mexico, in LAW AND
DEVELOPMENT OF MIDDLE-INCOME COUNTRIES: AVOIDING THE MIDDLE-INCOME TRAP 288,
288–306 (Randall Peerenboom & Tom Ginsberg eds., 2014).
128
Learn More About the Public Ministry of Brazil, PORTAL BRAZ., http://translate.google.com/
translate?sl=auto&tl=en&js=n&prev=_t&hl=en&ie=UTF-8&u=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.brasil.gov.
122
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One of the most significant legal developments involving animal protection in Brazil (or anywhere) was the enactment of the Brazilian Constitution of 1988, which explicitly recognizes fundamental rights for animals. 129
Article 225 states that:
All [people] have the right to an ecologically balanced environment, which is an asset of common use and essential to a healthy
quality of life, and both the Government and the community shall
have the duty to defend and preserve it for present and future
generations.
Paragraph 1—In order to ensure the effectiveness of this right, it is
incumbent upon the Government to . . . protect the fauna and the
flora, with prohibition, in the manner prescribed by law, of all
practices which represent a risk to their ecological function, cause
the extinction of a species or subject an animal to cruelty. 130
Since the Constitution’s enactment, animal protection laws have gained
broader acceptance.131 One important milestone was the 1998 enactment of
Article 32 of the Environmental Criminal Act (the “Act”), criminalizing
abuse, mistreatment, injury, and mutilation of domestic animals. 132 Violating this act can result in fines and/or imprisonment ranging from three
months to one year. 133
Even if the animal’s suffering was inflicted for a scientific or educational purpose, perpetrators may still be liable if they failed to seek out alternative approaches. 134 However, as with U.S. anti-cruelty laws, Brazil’s
Environmental Criminal Act does not protect agricultural animals. 135 For
br%2Fgoverno%2F2010%2F01%2Fministerio-publico&act=ur [https://perma.cc/VZR5-N54P] (last
updated July 28, 2014).
129
E. BRADFORD BURNS, A HISTORY OF BRAZIL 500 (1994) (stating that the 1988 Constitution was the fifth constitution since Brazil gained independence from Portugal in 1822, and was
the first since Brazil became a democracy following the end of the military dictatorship in 1985).
130
CONSTITUIÇÃO FEDERAL [C.F.] [CONSTITUTION] art. 225 (Braz.) (emphasis added).
131
Edna Cardoza Dias, A Defesa dos Animais e as Conquistas Legislativas do Movimento de
Proteção Animal no Brasil, 2 BRAZILIAN ANIMAL RIGHTS REV. 149, 160–61 (2007).
132
See Lei No. 9.605, Art. 32, de 12 de Fevereiro de 1998, DIARIO OFICIAL DA UNIAO
[D.O.U.] de 13.2.1998 (Braz.); Cassuto & Saville, supra note 8, at 202.
133
See Lei No. 9.605, Art. 32, de 12 de Fevereiro de 1998, DIARIO OFICIAL DA UNIAO [D.O.U.]
de 13.2.1998 (Braz.); Cassuto & Saville, supra note 8, at 202; Lane Azevedo Clayton, Overview of
Brazil’s Legal Structure for Animal Issues, MICH. ST. U. ANIMAL LEGAL & HISTORICAL CTR.
(2011), https://www.animallaw.info/article/overview-brazils-legal-structure-animal-issues [http:
perma.cc/Q2WN-H5Z9].
134
Clayton, supra note 133, at 4; see Gallegos, supra note 11 (describing event during which
Brazilian animal-rights activists liberated hundreds of beagles undergoing laboratory testing to
make a statement about animal welfare and rights).
135
Silva, supra note 11, at 86.
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example, Article 37 of the Act, entitled “Crimes against Fauna,” appears to
cover wild and domesticated animals. 136 Yet, the provision addressing
slaughter only provides for the legality of killing wild animals and hunting
for subsistence purposes—i.e., when it is carried out to satisfy a necessity of
hunger. 137 Omitting agricultural animals from this provision leaves them in
a legal limbo. While the legislature did not intend to outlaw the commercial
slaughter of animals, the extent to which it meant to regulate the practice
remains unclear. 138
Beyond general statutes prohibiting cruelty, Brazil, like the United
States, also has rules and guidance governing animal treatment during and
resulting from transport. 139 The Regulation of Industrial and Health Inspection of Products of Origin Act (2005) states that “animals must remain at
the lairage for rest and fasting for 24 hours.” 140 This requirement provides a
mandatory resting period in special resting pens before slaughter. 141 This
lairage requirement period can be reduced depending on the distance the
animal has traveled. 142 Moreover, like the United States, Brazil also excludes birds from laws governing transport or export that affect the welfare
of the animal. 143 However, unlike the United States, Brazil’s humane
slaughter laws do apply to birds in addition to mammals.144 Whether these
136

See Lei No. 9.605, Art. 37, de 12 de Fevereiro de 1998, DIARIO OFICIAL DA UNIAO
[D.O.U.] de 13.2.1998 (Braz.).
137
See id.
138
See Silva, supra note 11, at 86.
139
See, e.g., Decreto No. 24.548, de 3 de Julho de 1934, DIARIO OFICIAL DA UNIAO [D.O.U.]
de 3.7.1934 (Braz.) (“When transported by railroad, field animals that are destined for slaughter
may not be kept on board for periods of more than 72 hours.”); Decreto No. 5.741, de 30 de
Março de 2006, DIARIO OFICIAL DA UNIAO [D.O.U.] de 30.3.2006 (Braz.); Instrução Normativa
No. 18, de 18 de Julho de 2006, DIARIO OFICIAL DA UNIAO [D.O.U.] de 18.7.2006 (Braz.). For
more examples, see MINISTRY OF AGRIC., LIVESTOCK & FOOD SUPPLY, LEGISLATION MANUAL:
NATIONAL ANIMAL HEALTH PROGRAMS IN BRAZIL (2009), http://ww3.panaftosa.org.br/Comp/
MAPA/ManuaisTecnicos/ManualLegislacao/LegislationManualOK.pdf [perma.cc/8FTL-6YCJ].
140
JESSICA VAPNEK & MEGAN CHAPMAN, FOOD & AGRIC. ORG. OF THE U.N., LEGISLATIVE
AND REGULATORY OPTIONS FOR ANIMAL WELFARE 51 (2010), http://www.fao.org/docrep/013/
i1907e/i1907e00.pdf [http://perma.cc/9AF7-9KYJ].
141
Decreto No. 30.691, de 29 de Março de 1952, DIARIO OFICIAL DA UNIAO [D.O.U.] de
29.3.1952 (Braz.).
142
VAPNEK & CHAPMAN, supra note 140, at 51; Lairage, OXFORD DICTIONARY, http://www.
oxforddictionaries.com/us/definition/american_english/lairage [http://perma.cc/5QHJ-MMCV] (defining “Lairage” as “a place where cattle or sheep may be rested on the way to market or slaughter”).
143
See Cassuto & Saville, supra note 8, at 202–03.
144
See Decreto No. 94.554, de 24 de Juhlo de 1987, DIÁRIO OFICIAL DA UNIÃO [D.O.U.] de
24.7.1987 (Braz.) (addressing standards for housing and slaughter of commercial animals,
including birds); Instrucao Normativa No. 3, de 17 de Janeiro de 2000, DIÁRIO OFICIAL DA UNIÃO
[D.O.U.] de 17.1.2000 (Braz.) (addressing minimum requirements for humane slaughter,
including birds); Portaria No. 85, de 18 de Novembro de 1988, DIÁRIO OFICIAL DA UNIÃO
[D.O.U.] de 18.11.1988 (Braz.) (concerning standards for general conditions of operation for
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humane standards, on a practical level, are imputed into export and transport
legislation remains an open question. 145
The Brazilian government has also worked with the agricultural industry to implement what it terms “Good Agricultural Practices.” 146 This program was developed by the Brazilian Agricultural Research Corporation to
implement recommended standards for “vegetables, maize, soybeans, mangoes, melons, beef, milk, swine and broiler production.” 147 Specifically, the
program propounds general guidelines for cattle welfare. 148 Yet, as is evident from the linking of animals and vegetables, the emphasis lies on the
quality of the eventual food rather than the animals’ wellbeing. The focus
remains always on the food. 149
Brazil’s Good Agricultural Practice standards are worth comparing to
those of the European Union (“EU”). 150 The most significant difference is
that in Brazil, the decision to adopt the Good Agricultural Practice standards
is voluntary, not mandatory. 151 EU guidelines include a comprehensive approach predicated on the understanding that animals are “sentient beings”
and should be treated in such a way that they do not suffer unnecessarily. 152
All EU animal welfare directives emphasize the Five Freedoms:
1. Freedom from hunger and thirst—access to fresh water and a diet
for full health and vigor;

small and averaged-sized slaughterhouses, which includes birds); see also Cassuto & Saville,
supra note 8, at 202–03 (explaining that Brazil, unlike the United States, has laws specific to humane slaughter of poultry as well as mammals).
145
See Cassuto & Saville, supra note 8, at 202–03.
146
BRAZILIAN AGRIC. RESEARCH CORP., GUIDELINES FOR GOOD AGRICULTURAL PRACTICES: EMBRAPA’S INPUT TO FAO’S PRIORITY AREA OF INTERDISCIPLINARY ACTION ON INTEGRATED PRODUCTION SYSTEMS 7 (2002), http://www.fao.org/prods/gap/docs/pdf/guidelines_for_good_
agricultural_practices.pdf [http:perma.cc/F2GV-95YF]; Cassuto & Saville, supra note 8, at 203.
147
BRAZILIAN AGRIC. RESEARCH CORP., supra note 146, at 7.
148
VAPNEK & CHAPMAN, supra note 140, at 53 (explaining that it is essential to provide
animals with a comfortable and safe environment, freedom of movement, and protection against
stress, illness, pain, or unnecessary harms).
149
BRAZILIAN AGRIC. RESEARCH CORP., supra note 146, at 7.
150
See Cassuto & Saville, supra note 8, at 203.
151
Se e VAPNEK & CHAPMAN, supra note 140, at 31 n.22 (highlighting Brazilian Program of
Good Agricultural Practices as an example of non-binding best practice codes developed by industry associations).
152
See Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council and
the European Economic and Social Committee on the European Union Strategy for the Protection
and Welfare of Animals 2012–2015, EU COM (2012) 006 final (Jan. 19, 2012) (“Article 13 of the
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union recognizes animals as sentient beings and requires full regard be given to the welfare requirements of animals while formulating and enforcing
some EU policies.”).
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2. Freedom from discomfort—an appropriate environment with shelter and comfortable rest areas;
3. Freedom from pain, injury and disease—prevention or rapid
treatment;
4. Freedom to express normal behavior—adequate space and facilities, company of the animal’s own kind;
5. Freedom from fear and distress—conditions and treatment which
avoid mental suffering. 153
In 1998, the EU enacted welfare legislation for agricultural animals to
ensure that “owners or keepers take all reasonable steps to ensure the welfare of animals under their care and to ensure that those animals are not
caused any unnecessary pain, suffering or injury.” 154 The directive enumerates specific requirements including freedom of movement, air circulation,
adequate lighting, and appropriate food and water supplies. 155
In 2009, the EU also mandated that “[n]o person shall transport animals or cause animals to be transported in a way likely to cause injury or
undue suffering to them.” 156 Finally, EU standards for slaughter aim to
avoid pain and minimize the stress and suffering endured by farm animals
during the process. 157 The regulation heightened operator responsibilities,
imposed stricter standards, and increased training and research. 158 These
standards are mandatory in all EU member countries.159
Though Brazil’s Good Agricultural Practices conform with or exceed
EU animal welfare standards and while many Brazilian producers participate, the Brazilian guidelines are voluntary. 160 Consequently, inhumane
treatment remains entrenched throughout the industry. 161 In an effort to address these and other animal welfare issues, the Brazilian Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock and Food Supply established the Permanent Technical
Commission on Animal Welfare (“MAPA”). 162
153

DIRECTORATE GEN. FOR HEALTH & CONSUMER PROT., supra note 9, at 1.
Council Directive 98/58/EC, art. 3, 1998 O.J. (L 221) 1 (EC).
155
Id. at Annex.
156
Council Regulation 1/2005, art. 3, 2004 O.J. (L 3) 1 (EC).
157
See Council Regulation 1099/2009, ch. 2, art. 3, 2009 O.J. (L 303) 1 (EC).
158
See id.
159
Council Regulation 1/2005, art. 3, 2004 O.J. (L 3) 1 (EC).
160
See VAPNEK & CHAPMAN, supra note 140, at 31 n.22 (highlighting Brazilian Program of
Good Agricultural Practices as an example of non-binding best practice codes developed by industry associations).
161
Cassuto & Saville, supra note 8, at 203; see, e.g., Harald Grethe, High Animal Welfare
Standards in the EU and International Trade—How to Prevent Potential ‘Low Animal Welfare
Havens’?, 32 FOOD POL’Y 315, 318 (2007).
162
MINISTRY OF AGRIC., LIVESTOCK & FOOD SUPPLY, ANIMAL WELFARE IN BRAZIL (n.d.),
http://www.abiec.com.br/img/folder-animal-welfare.pdf [http://perma.cc/B396-U4CD].
154
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Among other responsibilities, MAPA’s portfolio requires that it:
[D]evelop and propose legislation, standards and technical recommendations of good practices for Animal Welfare; encourage
and promote events related to the Commission’s target topic;
promote training of all involved in the livestock chain; articulate
with representative entities of the livestock and research sectors;
propose publication and dissemination of technical material and
information on animal welfare [and] encourage and propose
agreements, covenants and terms of cooperation with public and
private entities to promote actions linked to Animal Welfare.163
Additionally, MAPA collaborated with the World Society for the Protection
of Animals (“WSPA”) to initiate the “Steps” program. 164 Steps is concerned
with “theoretical and on-site training on pre-slaughter and humane slaughter
practices.” 165 The WSPA contracted with MAPA to provide veterinarians in
Brazil with training in animal welfare standards.166 Lastly, MAPA officially
acknowledged the Brazilian Poultry Union’s voluntary animal welfare protocol for broiler chickens and turkeys. 167 As in the United States, chickens
and turkeys make up a very high percentage of agricultural animals in Brazil. 168 Thus, having some protections in place for them is highly significant.
While MAPA’s acknowledgement and collaboration with the WSPA do not
create actual legal protections for animals, they nonetheless support animal
welfare goals and complement currently available regulatory and legal
measures. 169
Amidst these existing regulations and voluntary standards, Brazilian
agricultural animals continue to endure hardships over and above those inherent to the meat and dairy industries. 170 For example, in the last decade,
163

Id.
Rosangela Poletto & Maria J. Hotzel, The Five Freedoms in the Global Animal Agriculture
Market, Challenges and Achievements as Opportunities, 2 ANIMAL FRONTIERS 22, 28 (2014).
165
Id.
166
See id. at 26–27.
167
See id. at 26.
168
See generally U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., LIVESTOCK AND POULTRY: WORLD MARKETS AND
TRADE (2015), http://apps.fas.usda.gov/psdonline/circulars/livestock_poultry.pdf [http://perma.cc/
4ZWK-BYF7] (comparing the various “Selected Country Summary” tables to demonstrate that
poultry constitutes a high percentage of agricultural animals in both the United States and Brazil).
169
See Poletto & Hotzel, supra note 164, at 28.
170
See Gabriel Elizondo, Brazil Drought Dries Up Milk Production, AL JAZEERA (Feb. 28,
2013), http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2013/02/20132271178852954.html [http://perma.
cc/Y29Q-FS46]; Keeping It Real, MEAT & POULTRY (Apr. 24, 2009), http://www.meatpoultry.
com/Writers/Other%20Contributors/Keeping%20it%20real.aspx?cck=1 [http://perma.cc/AYP54BGG]. See generally Carlos Steiger, Modern Beef Production in Brazil and Argentina, 21
CHOICES 105 (2006), http://www.choicesmagazine.org/2006-2/tilling/2006-2-12.pdf [http://perma.
164
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Brazil’s live export industry—already massive—has surged. 171 Live export
involves transporting living animals to other countries for slaughter. 172 Brazil exports approximately 480,000 cattle per year, primarily to Venezuela
and Lebanon. 173 Though Brazil boasts of the quality of its “green” cattle,
the exportation process involves a long journey, often by truck and boat during which the animals are crammed into very small spaces, often without
access to food or water. 174 All steps of the process create traumatic, stressful, and unhealthy conditions that lead to terrible suffering and high mortality. 175 As a result, and even assuming the animals were well-treated prior to
beginning their final journey, the next phase of their short lives is well beyond what most would consider humane or even endurable. 176 In sum, the
protections afforded to agricultural animals in Brazil are insufficient, just as
they are in the United States. 177 And, as the industry continues to grow, the
number of animals and quantum of mistreatment will necessarily grow, as
well. 178
II. EXEMPTING AGRICULTURAL ANIMALS FROM ANTI-CRUELTY
PROTECTION EXACERBATES THE PROBLEM
The foregoing discussion identified laws and practices currently in
place that address animal welfare in both the United States and Brazil. 179
cc/D745-2JME] (explaining the growth of Brazil’s beef production while also acknowledging the
need for improvement therein).
171
PONTIFÍCIA UNIVERSIDADE CATÓLICA DO RIO DE JANEIRO, EXPORTAÇÃO BRASILEIRA DE
BOVINOS VIVOS 45 (n.d.), http://www.maxwell.vrac.puc-rio.br/18154/18154_5.PDF [http://perma.
cc/2878-85V4] (noting that in the last seven years, Brazil has become the third largest exporter of
live beef in the world); see ASS’N OF BRAZ. BEEF EXPS., STRUCTURE OF BRAZILIAN BEEF CHAIN
(2010), www.abiec.com.br/download/Brazilian%20Beef%20Chain.pdf [http://perma.cc/NN9WJ8SM]; Cassuto & Saville, supra note 8, at 200–01.
172
See Let’s End the Cruelty of Live Export, WORLD ANIMAL PROT., http://www.world
animalprotection.org.au/our-work/animals-in-farming/live-export [http://perma.cc/M44M-23LY].
173
See ASSOSIAÇÃO BRASILEIRA DOS EXPORTADORES DE GADO, VANTAGENS DA EXPORTAÇÃO
DE BOVINOS VIVOS NO BRASIL 45 (2013), http://www.abegbrasil.org/Scot/revista4/.
174
See Phil Brooke, Live Animal Exports, in THE GLOBAL GUIDE TO ANIMAL PROTECTION
104, 104–06 (Andrew Linzey ed., 2014); Sustainability: History, BRAZILIAN BEEF, http://www.
brazilianbeef.org.br/texto.asp?id=3 [http://perma.cc/U5XF-4GFX] (noting that the term “Green”
cattle describes sustainable cattle production that does not degrade or harm the surrounding natural environment).
175
See Brooke, supra note 174.
176
See id.
177
See supra notes 41–176 and accompanying text.
178
See Elizabeth Bennett, Animal Agriculture Laws on the Chopping Block: Comparing United States and Brazil, 31 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 531, 543–44 (2014) (describing how farming in
Brazil is becoming more concentrated, worsening the conditions for farmed animals and augmenting mass production techniques).
179
See supra notes 41–176 and accompanying text.
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While the United States provides agricultural animals with fewer statutory
and regulatory protections, widespread mistreatment is the norm in both
countries. 180 Unfortunately, in both the United States and Brazil, the reach
of cruelty protections is quite narrow, effectively applying only to house
pets. 181 Because pets comprise a miniscule percentage of animals in human
society, cruelty laws as written and applied offer very little animal protection at all. 182 Indeed, as David Wolfson has observed, the number of animals
protected by law as compared to those who have no protection at all is so
small that animal law as such effectively does not exist. 183 This section examines the animal cruelty that arises from the “common” practices of industrial farms in both nations despite their respective legal and regulatory regimes and alleged commitment to animal welfare.184
Most agricultural animals:
[N]ever experience sunshine, grass, trees, fresh air, unfettered
movement, sex, or many other things that make up most of what
we think of as the ordinary pattern of life on earth. They are castrated without anesthesia, on occasion deliberately starved, live in
conditions of extreme and unrelieved crowding, and suffer physical deformities as a result of genetic manipulation.185
For example, Smithfield Foods, the largest pork producer in the world, produces six billion pounds of pig meat annually by confining the animals “by
the hundreds or thousands in warehouse-like barns, in rows of wall-to-wall
pens . . . . Forty fully grown 250-pound male hogs often occupy a pen the
size of a tiny apartment . . . . There is no sunlight, straw, fresh air, or
earth.” 186 Though Smithfield Foods committed to a phase-out program for
gestation crates in 2009 and 2011, as of January 2014 the crates remained in
180

See supra notes 41–176 and accompanying text.
See Cassuto & Saville, supra note 8, at 195, 203; Farmed Animals and the Law, ANIMAL
LEGAL DEF. FUND, http://aldf.org/resources/advocating-for-animals/farmed-animals-and-the-law/
[perma.cc/CPV6-Q38K] (last updated Mar. 23, 2015).
182
Compare Pet Statistics, ASPCA, https://www.aspca.org/animal-homelessness/shelterintake-and-surrender/pet-statistics [perma.cc/RT6W-6S9C] (estimating that U.S. families currently own approximately 70–80 million pet dogs and 74–96 million pet cats), with Farm Animal
Statistics: Slaughter Totals, supra note 3 (estimating that 9.1 billion farm animals were slaughtered in the United States in 2014 alone).
183
See Wolfson, supra note 2, at 124.
184
See infra notes 185–212 and accompanying text.
185
Anastasia S. Stathopoulos, Note, You Are What Your Food Eats: How Regulation of Factory Farm Conditions Could Improve Human Health and Animal Welfare Alike, 13 N.Y.U. J.
LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 407, 411 (2010) (citing Wolfson & Sullivan, supra note 6).
186
Jeff Tietz, Boss Hog: The Dark Side of America's Top Pork Producer, ROLLING STONE
(Dec. 14, 2006), http://www.rollingstone.com/culture/news/boss-hog-the-dark-side-of-americastop-pork-producer-20061214 [http://perma.cc/9DX3-3Y7Q].
181
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use in almost half of the company’s facilities and in many of the independent facilities with which Smithfield contracts for pork. 187
Gestation crates are cages that confine sows to a space so small that
they cannot even turn around. 188 The pigs languish in these crates for
years. 189 In addition to the obvious and ongoing discomfort they create, gestation crates cause an “elevated risk of urinary tract infections, weakened
bones, lameness, behavioral restriction, and stereotypies.” 190 Gestation
crates are common in both Brazil and the United States, and are but one of
countless examples of the mistreatment that forms the norm for billions of
animals. 191
Confinement practices often result in animals getting trampled and
starved, as well as causing lameness, leg and joint disorders, emotional distress, and other health problems. 192 In the egg industry, male chicks are
killed shortly after they are hatched (males add no value to the egg production process). 193 Females have their beaks cut off without anesthetic before
getting confined to tiny battery cages where they endure unremitting discomfort until becoming “spent” (unable to produce). 194 They are then killed,
187
See Clare Leschin-Hoar, Pork Farmers to Let Pregnant Pigs Out of Confinement Crates,
TAKEPART (Jan. 9, 2014), http://www.takepart.com/article/2014/01/09/beginning-end-gestationcrates [http://perma.cc/CT27-722J]; Smithfield Foods Recommits to 2017 Phase-Out of Gestation
Crates, HUMANE SOC’Y OF THE U.S. (Dec. 8, 2011), http://www.humanesociety.org/news/press_
releases/2011/12/smithfield_foods_recommits_12082011.html.
188
Crammed into Gestation Crates: Life for America’s Breeding Pigs, HUMANE SOC’Y OF
THE U.S. (Feb. 19, 2014), http://humanesociety.org/issues/confinement_farm/facts/gestation_crates.
html.
189
Leahy, supra note 45, at 67.
190
HUMANE SOC’Y INT’L, AN HSI BRAZIL REPORT: THE WELFARE OF INTENSIVELY CONFINED ANIMALS IN BATTERY CAGES, GESTATION CRATES, AND VEAL CRATES 4 (n.d.) [hereinafter HSI BRAZIL REPORT], http://www.hsi.org/assets/pdfs/welfare-of-intensively-confined-animalsbrazil-sept-08.pdf [http://perma.cc/K2XK-9X3C].
191
See WORLD SOC’Y FOR THE PROT. OF ANIMALS, ALTERNATIVAS PRÁTICAS Á PECUÁRIA
INDUSTRIAL NA AMERICA LATINA 4–5 (2010), http://issuu.com/wspa_brasil/docs/alternativas_
praticas_a_pecuaria_industrial/9; A Closer Look at Animals on Factory Farms, ASPCA, https://
www.aspca.org/animal-cruelty/factory-farms/animals-factory-farms [perma.cc/9HGK-NY2V] (describing the agricultural norms for animal treatment throughout the beef cattle, dairy cattle, and
veal industries in the United States); Humane Society International and Partners Deliver Petition
Asking for Farm Animal Welfare Legislation, HUMANE SOC’Y INT’L (Mar. 21, 2012), http://www.
hsi.org/news/press_releases/2012/03/petition_032112.html (stating that in Brazil, “The majority of
breeding sows (female pigs) are confined in individual metal gestation crates for nearly their entire
lives, unable to even turn around”).
192
Stathopoulos, supra note 185, at 411–12.
193
See Sheila Rodriguez, The Morally Informed Consumer: Examining Animal Welfare Claims
on Egg Labels, 30 TEMP. J. SCI. TECH. & ENVTL. L. 51, 57 (2011).
194
See UNITED EGG PRODUCERS, UNITED EGG PRODUCERS ANIMAL HUSBANDRY GUIDELINES
8 (2010), http://www.unitedegg.org/information/pdf/UEP_2010_Animal_Welfare_Guidelines.pdf
[http://perma.cc/3CVP-FADV] (explaining that the purpose of beak trimming is to prevent cannibalism, pecking, feather pulling, and fighting amongst birds, but that it causes difficulty eating and
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often so carelessly that their deaths are slow and gruesome. 195 Within the
United States, 95–98% of eggs come from hens raised in these wire cages
too small for the hens even to spread their wings. 196
In Brazil, “More than 90 percent of eggs are produced by birds who
spend almost their entire lives confined in small battery cages in which each
hen is given less space than a single sheet of letter-sized paper.” 197 These
cages prevent birds from nesting, dust-bathing, perching, scratching, freely
walking, and a whole host of other natural behaviors.” 198 Battery cages are
stacked by the hundreds and thousands, and, in addition to causing the
physical suffering mentioned above, they create psychological stresses that
lead to cannibalism, emotional distress, and death. 199
Even when cruel practices are exposed and publicized, it causes little
change in the animals’ treatment. 200 The veal industry, for example, has received a great deal of attention, but the confinement practices that caused
the public outcry remain widespread. 201 Veal calves are typically chained by
their necks in stalls so small that they can barely move for their entire sixteen-week lives. 202 They are usually kept in the dark, and fed a nutrientdeficient diet to keep them anemic. 203 The resulting iron-deficiency means

drinking, stress, and chronic and acute pain); Bruce Friedrich, The Cruelest of All Factory Farm
Products: Eggs from Caged Hens, HUFFPOST GREEN: THE BLOG (Mar. 16, 2013), http://www.
huffingtonpost.com/bruce-friedrich/eggs-from-caged-hens_b_2458525.html [http://perma.cc/2PXT4SSP] (“Battery cages are small wire cages where about 95 percent of laying hens spend their entire
lives; each hen is given about 67–76 square inches of space.”).
195
Leahy, supra note 45, at 65–66.
196
Id.
197
Humane Society International and Partners Deliver Petition Asking for Farm Animal
Welfare Legislation, supra note 191.
198
HSI BRAZIL REPORT, supra note 190, at 2.
199
Id.; SARA SHIELDS & IAN J.H. DUNCAN, HUMANE SOC’Y OF THE U.S., AN HSUS REPORT: A
COMPARISON OF THE WELFARE OF HENS IN BATTERY CAGES AND ALTERNATIVE SYSTEMS 2–8
(n.d.), http://www.humanesociety.org/assets/pdfs/farm/hsus-a-comparison-of-the-welfare-of-hens-inbattery-cages-and-alternative-systems.pdf [http://perma.cc/L8KH-QZJH].
200
See Lauren Pack, Animal Cruelty a Problem Despite Increased Attention, JOURNAL-NEWS
(Oct. 19, 2013, 9:00 AM), http://www.journal-news.com/news/news/animal-cruelty-a-problemdespite-increased-attenti/nbRq7/ [http://perma.cc/TB9H-G4RQ] (describing increase in animal
cruelty cases for mistreatment of companion animals, despite increased awareness regarding the
animal cruelty issue); Veal Crates: Unnecessary and Cruel, HUMANE SOC’Y OF THE U.S. (Feb.
22, 2013), http://www.humanesociety.org/issues/confinement_farm/facts/veal.html.
201
See, e.g., Paul Gould, Cruel, Yes, but Very Tasty, FIN. TIMES (June 2006), http://www.ft.
com/intl/cms/s/0/e83f62b4-f819-11da-9481-0000779e2340.html#axzz3wag09w72 (describing how
sow gestation crates persist despite public opposition); Veal Crates: Unnecessary and Cruel, supra note 200 (describing how inhumane practices in the veal industry persist despite “almost universal public opposition”).
202
See Leahy, supra note 45, at 68–69.
203
Id.
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that the calves’ flesh has the pale color that consumers have traditionally
preferred. 204 “Suckling” pigs endure a similarly short and miserable life. 205
The list of cruel practices continues and has been well documented
elsewhere. 206 In the pork industry, piglet’s tails are cut off, their ears are
notched, and male pigs are castrated, all without anesthetic.207 Beef cattle
must endure (among other things) dehorning, castration, and branding, also
without any anesthetic. 208 Because slaughter methods are either underregulated or unenforced in both countries, common methods of slaughter
also cause significant suffering. 209 The animals are often inadequately
stunned and thus conscious as they get boiled and skinned alive. 210
Clearly, inhumane treatment is commonplace in both nations and
shows no sign of abating. 211 The next section offers an explanation describing the underlying forces that allow for and support common practices of
agricultural animal mistreatment. 212
III. LACK OF PROTECTION AND CRUELTY TO AGRICULTURAL ANIMALS
HAVE BECOME ENTRENCHED WITHIN THE UNITED STATES AND BRAZIL
A. United States—Pressures and Political Tensions Leading to Lack of
Protection Against Cruelty
The agricultural lobby in the United States has historically wielded
enormous power and influence on the legislative and regulatory processes,
as well as on the imagination of the American public. 213 Unfortunately, the
reality of the agricultural industry has little in common with the popular
imagination or the rhetoric of the political process. Within the agricultural
industry animals are referred to as “‘food-producing units,’ ‘protein harvesters,’ ‘converting machines,’ ‘crops,’ ‘grain-consuming animal units’ (as
204

See Farm Animal Welfare: Cows, MSPCA-ANGELL, http://www.mspca.org/programs/
animal-protection-legislation/animal-welfare/farm-animal-welfare/factory-farming/cows/veal-calveson-a-factory-farm.html [http://perma.cc/8772-8DJH].
205
See Gould, supra note 201 (describing the life, death, and consumption of these animals,
and defining suckling pigs as piglets that are taken from their mothers and killed for food when
they are approximately three weeks old).
206
See Leahy, supra note 45, at 65–69.
207
See id. at 65–66.
208
Id. at 67–69.
209
See Bennett, supra note 178, at 538–56.
210
See Leahy, supra note 45, at 67–69; see also WORLD SOC’Y FOR THE PROT. OF ANIMALS,
supra note 191.
211
See supra notes 179–210 and accompanying text.
212
See infra notes 213–264 and accompanying text.
213
DAVID N. CASSUTO, ANIMALS & SOC’Y. INST., THE CAFO HOTHOUSE: CLIMATE CHANGE,
INDUSTRIAL AGRICULTURE AND THE LAW 16 (2010), http://www.derechoanimal.info/images/pdf/
Cassuto-CAFO-Nothouse.pdf [http://perma.cc/35KW-8N3Z].
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defined by the United States Department of Agriculture) and ‘biomachines.’” 214
The impact of these terms goes beyond the merely linguistic. It changes the way animals and their needs are perceived.215 One can scarcely imagine, for example, lobbying for stricter laws to protect a “protein harvester”
or a “grain-consuming animal unit.” 216 Indeed, the costs involved in preserving the animals’ well-being are viewed as balance sheet net negatives to
be reduced whenever possible. 217 Relegating animals to mere components
of an industrial process derogates their sentience and renders their wellbeing an ancillary concern at best.218 At worst, the animals’ basic needs are
perceived as costs to be reduced, liabilities the significance of which gets
measured in dollars rather than by quotient of suffering. 219
Moreover, the U.S. government, prodded by the farm lobby, has created “a legally protected sphere whereby any act, if it is viewed as customary
by the United States farming community, is determined not to be cruel.” 220
Dating back to the post-WWII era:
[T]he post-war economy allowed people to purchase more meat
per capita, the percentage of Americans who were sustenance
farmers dropped, and technological advances allowed industrial
means to be applied to agricultural production, including intensive confinement, mechanized treatment, and the beginnings of
genetic manipulation of animals to increase their meat, egg, and
milk output. 221
This economic climate fostered factory farming, and as industrial agriculture grew, the industry gained stronger political power and consumers became more accustomed to semantically obscuring their meat consumption
by “labeling pig as pork bacon, or sausage; cow as beef or hamburger;
sheep as mutton; calves as veal; and deer as venison.” 222 The animal itself

214

Wolfson, supra note 2, at 147.
Id. (describing how the words humans use help them “remain ignorant of the abuse of
living creatures that lies behind the food we eat”).
216
See id. (describing how humans “disguise the source of meat” so as not to be reminded
where it comes from).
217
See Bennett, supra note 178, at 562.
218
Wolfson, supra note 2, at 147.
219
See id. at 127 (discussing animals seen as economic goods, in relation to human benefit).
220
Id. at 147.
221
Leahy, supra note 45, at 65.
222
Wolfson, supra note 2, at 147; see Wechsler, supra note 51, at 200 (noting that due to the
pressure from the agricultural industry advocates, Congress omitted poultry in the final version of
the Humane Methods of Slaughter Act).
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was no longer foremost in the vocabulary of consumption and as a result,
lost primacy in the consciousness of the consumer, as well. 223
The modern agricultural industry has enormous political power and
uses the romantic rhetoric of the family farm to shield itself from regulation
and critical scrutiny. 224 Yet, the modern agricultural industry is completely
different than the small family-run farms of eras past. 225 Today, a few giant
corporations dominate the industry. 226 A 2012 study from the University of
Missouri-Columbia found that “the four largest companies controlled 82
percent of the beef packing industry, 85 percent of soybean processing, 63
percent of pork packing, and 53 percent of broiler chicken processing.” 227
As one commenter points out, “[A]gribusiness concentration works in many
ways, all with same objective: to move income from farmers and rural
economies to Wall Street.” 228 So, even as the industry appropriates the culturally powerful rhetoric of the small farmer to lobby and advertise, its
methods and policies actually drive small farmers out of business. 229
In the United States, the industry’s power is visible at every phase of
the regulatory process. 230 For example, the American Farm Bureau Federation successfully deterred Congress from passing a bill that would have required an eighteen-month delay before the merger of big agricultural companies. 231 The bill would have also required the formation of a Commission
to examine market power and concentration in the agricultural industry. 232
The federal government has supported agribusiness for decades
through price support programs, mandatory generic advertising campaigns,
223

See Cassuto & Saville, supra note 8, at 195, 204; Wechsler, supra note 51, at 200.
See CASSUTO, supra note 213, at 8.
225
See id. at 7–8.
226
See, e.g., Wolfson, supra note 2, at 145 (quoting Senator Metzenbaum as stating, “Twenty
companies produce eighty percent of U.S. poultry. Four [of these] companies produce forty percent”).
227
FOOD & WATER WATCH, THE ECONOMIC COST OF FOOD MONOPOLIES 4 (2012) https://
www.foodandwaterwatch.org/sites/default/files/Food%20Monopolies%20Report%20Nov%20201
2.pdf [perma.cc/F7UT-WGXE].
228
Id. (“Large retailers now have so much buying power that they have considerable influence over which foods are available to the public, the methods in which the foods are produced
and the prices paid to their suppliers.”).
229
See CASSUTO, supra note 213, at 1–2; FOOD & WATER WATCH, supra note 227, at 4–5.
230
See Steve Johnson, The Politics of Meat, FRONTLINE, http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/
frontline/shows/meat/politics/ [http://perma.cc/J8H4-8M75] (detailing how the agricultural industry exerts substantial influence over the governmental decision-making process as it pertains to the
industry).
231
See Agribusiness Merger Moratorium and Antitrust Review Act of 1999, H.R. 3159, 106th
Cong. at 9 (1999); A.V. Krebs, U.S. Senate Votes 71–27 to Reject Wellstone Agribusiness Merger
Moratorium, AGRIBUSINESS EXAM’R (Nov. 23, 1999), http://www.thecalamityhowler.com/agbiz/
agex-56.html [http://perma.cc/6F39-UQ95].
232
See Wechsler, supra note 51, at 190.
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the national school lunch program, and exemptions from environmental
regulations. 233 Federal policies also incentivize Confined Animal Feeding
Operations (“CAFOs”) through tax breaks and subsidies for building feedlots. 234 Furthermore, as the Agricultural Act of 2014 (“Farm Bill”) demonstrates, even as deficit and price support programs have come under increased scrutiny, support for the agricultural industry remains a priority. 235
Under the Farm Bill, the industry continues to receive (among other benefits) subsidized crop insurance and subsidies for rice and peanut growers.236
It barely merits mention that the law does not address animal welfare standards at all. 237
At the state level, statutory exemptions for “customary farming practices” that cause widespread animal suffering are common. 238 Because “customary” is determined by the agricultural industry, which profits from the
practices, the interest of the agricultural animal is unprotected and ignored. 239 In the aggregate, state exemptions and a lack of federal protection
have enabled the agricultural industry to determine for itself what protections should be afforded to the animals. Unsurprisingly, such protections are
virtually nonexistent. 240

233

Ruhl, supra note 89, at 331–33; Wechsler, supra note 51, at 183–84.
See Wechsler, supra note 51, at 185.
235
See David Orden & Carl Zulauf, The Political Economy of the 2014 Farm Bill, AGRIC. &
APPLIED ECON. ASS’N, Jan. 4, 2015, at 1, 3–4, http://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?
q=cache:mD7nw727tYQJ:https://www.aeaweb.org/aea/2015conference/program/retrieve.php%3F
pdfid%3D262+&cd=1&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=us&client=safari [https://perma.cc/FC4T-C77D]. See
generally Agricultural Act of 2014, Pub. L. No. 113-79, 128 Stat. 649–1005 (codified as amended
at scattered sections of 7 U.S.C.).
236
See generally Agricultural Act of 2014, 128 Stat. 649–1005 (providing benefits to the agriculture industry; Ron Nixon, Senate Passes Long-Stalled Farm Bill, with Clear Winners and Losers,
N.Y. TIMES, (Feb. 4, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/02/05/us/politics/senate-passes-longstalled-farm-bill.html?_r=0 [http://perma.cc/U9CE-UZ7X] (describing how the Farm Bill “created
new subsidies for rice and peanut growers”).
237
See generally Agricultural Act of 2014, 128 Stat. 649–1005 (demonstrating the government’s great concern with supporting the agricultural industry while not demonstrating that same
concern for animal welfare).
238
See supra notes 179–212 and accompanying text.
239
Wolfson, supra note 2 at 147.
240
See Matheny & Leahy, supra note 5, at 326; Wolfson, supra note 2, at 151; Wolfson &
Sullivan, supra note 6, at 210.
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B. Brazil—Pressures and Political Tensions Leading to Lack of
Protection Against Cruelty
Brazil’s agricultural lobby is similarly powerful as that of the United
States, and its power continues to grow. 241 Unlike the United States, the
lobby in Brazil remains informal and difficult to monitor or track. 242 Even
as it has eschewed a formal organizational structure, the agribusiness lobby
has gained an outsized voice on many legal, political, and economic decisions. 243 This has led to widespread subsidies, which have further bolstered
the industry and increased its influence in a repeating cycle of empowerment and enrichment. 244 As the power and influence of the agricultural industry has grown, concern for animal well-being has decreased. 245 Given
the bottom-line focus of the industry and the fact that animals are viewed as
fungible with low replacement costs, this trend reflects the industry’s logic. 246 With consumption of animal products continuing to increase, the
means by which the industry meets the ballooning global demand will inevitably result in more harm to more animals.247

241

See Alastair Stewart, Agriculture Drags Along Brazilian Economy, DTN: PROGRESSIVE
FARMER, (Sept. 24. 2013, 11:09 AM), http://www.dtnprogressivefarmer.com/dtnag/common/
\link.do?symbolicName=/ag/blogs/template1&blogHandle=southamerica&blogEntryId=8a82c0bc
3e43976e014150bb4a521e1e [http://perma.cc/6ZN3-KFPE].
242
Compare Richard Briffault, The Anxiety of Influence: The Evolving Regulation of Lobbying, 13 ELECTION L.J. 160, 162, 165–66 (2014) (describing the regulations imposed upon lobbyists in the United States), with Sobrevivência da Velha Bancada Ruralista é de 51,2% [Survival of
the Old Rural Caucus Is 51.2%], INESC (Aug. 10, 2010), http://www.inesc.org.br/noticias/
noticias-do-inesc/2010/outubro/bancada-ruralista-perdeu-45-9-dos-integrantes
[http://perma.cc/
V2LW-DES3] (describing how the agriculture lobby in Brazil rarely acts in a coordinated manner).
243
Rasheed Abou-Alsamh, Brazil’s Agricultural Boom: Farmers Face Off Against Indians in
Classic Conflict Pitting People Seeking Land Against People Growing Food, INT’L BUS. TIMES,
(June 8, 2013, 10:26 AM), http://www.ibtimes.com/brazils-agricultural-boom-farmers-face-againstindians-classic-conflict-pitting-people-seeking-land [http://perma.cc/N59A-A4JW].
244
See Stewart, supra note 241.
245
See HUMANE SOC’Y. INT’L, HSI FACT SHEET: THE IMPACT OF ANIMAL AGRICULTURE ON
THE ENVIRONMENT AND CLIMATE CHANGE IN BRAZIL 1 (n.d.) [hereinafter HSI FACT SHEET], http://
www.hsi.org/assets/pdfs/hsi-fa-white-papers/brazil_climate_change_factsheet.pdf [http://perma.cc/
BZ5F-2U9N].
246
See HARWOOD D. SCHAFFER ET AL., PEW COMM’N ON INDUS. FARM ANIMAL PROD.,
ECONOMICS OF INDUSTRIAL FARM ANIMAL PRODUCTION 31, 33 (n.d.), http://www.ncifap.org/
_images/212-6_pcifap_ecnmics_v5_tc.pdf [http://perma.cc/7L85-LBRP] (exploring the costs of
industrial farm animal production, and concluding that, “CAFOs appear to be efficient because
they can externalize significant costs onto others and society at large”).
247
See Poletto & Hotzel, supra note 164, at 24 (“According to a FAO report (2009), meat
consumption in the developed countries is expected to increase by about 15 million tons over the
20-year period (1995–2015) in contrast with 75 million tons forecasted in the developing world
within the same time frame.”).
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Consumer backlash sometimes leads to reforms within the industry. 248
Yet, when reforms lead to increased costs, there is a marked drop-off in the
public’s willingness to pressure the industry to change. 249 Studies have
shown that cost, rather than conscience, most often drives purchasing decisions. 250
Brazil is home to large corporations that control a substantial portion
of the agricultural market. 251 This economic dominance allows these entities
to exercise significant influence on policymaking. 252 Also similar to the
United States, Brazilian agricultural production has prospered at the expense of small farmers. 253 As in other emerging economies, Brazil has consolidated production through vertical integration. 254 In Brazil, four integrators supply 40% of broiler chickens. 255 In the dairy industry, the number of
milk producers fell by 23% between 2000 and 2002 while the volume of
milk production stayed the same. 256 In the state of Santa Catarina alone,
“20,000 families left the countryside in 1998, many leaving pig and poultry
production because they could not compete with the big corporations.” 257
Similar trends are visible throughout the country, fueling the growth of industrial agriculture and fortifying its impact on policymaking. 258
Brazil’s regulatory process also faces the threat of agency capture. 259
As the largest meat exporter in the world, Brazil’s cattle herd exceeds 250
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Id. at 23, 27.
Id. at 27.
250
Id. at 23; see Terence J. Centner, Limitations on the Confinement of Food Animals in the
United States, 23 J. AGRIC. & ENVTL. ETHICS 469, 470 (2010); Athanasios Krystaliss et al., Attitudes of European Citizens Towards Pig Production Systems, 126 LIVESTOCK SCI. 46, 47 (2009);
Jayson L. Lusk & F. Bailey Norwood, Public Opinion and the Ethics and Governance of Farm
Animal Welfare, 233 J. AM. VET. MED. ASS’N 1, 1–6 (2008).
251
See HSI FACT SHEET, supra note 245, at 1.
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See id; Análises e Infográficos Quem é Quem no Mundo Rural, REPUBLICA DOS
RURALISTAS, http://www.republicadosruralistas.com.br/analises/3 [http://perma.cc/J88A-WRVG];
Paulo Prada, Fateful Harvest: Why Brazil Has a Big Appetite for Risky Pesticides, REUTERS (Apr. 2,
2015,
2:50
PM),
http://www.reuters.com/investigates/special-report/brazil-pesticides/
[http://perma.cc/RBM4-2GB4].
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See HSI FACT SHEET, supra note 245, at 1.
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See id.
255
Id.
256
Id.; see Josh Marks, Regulating Agricultural Pollution in Georgia: Recent Trends and the
Debate Over Integrator Liability, 18 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 1031, 1033 (2002) (defining integrators as
“corporate owners of . . . animals”).
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JANICE COX, WORLD SOC’Y FOR THE PROT. OF ANIMALS, INDUSTRIAL ANIMAL AGRICULTURE: PART OF THE POVERTY PROBLEM 17 (2007), http://www.worldanimalprotection.ca/sites/
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million animals.260 Nonetheless, and despite its recent emergence as a global economic power, Brazil remains in many respects a developing nation. 261
Its economy is fragile and its comparatively strong animal welfare standards
exist in tension with its economic impulsion to generate the maximum
amount of animal products at the lowest possible cost. 262 Additionally, Permanent Technical Commission on Animal Welfare, the agency assigned to
promote animal welfare within the agricultural industry, focuses instead on
management strategies aimed at yielding the highest production and best
quality of meat. 263 Animal welfare is a secondary concern at best. 264
IV. SOLUTIONS TO PROMOTING THE WELL-BEING OF ANIMALS WITHIN THE
AGRICULTURAL INDUSTRY
The raw political power of the agricultural industry coupled with undiscerning consumer demand has created a regulatory vacuum in the United
States, as well as widespread exemptions and lack of enforcement in the
United States and Brazil. 265 Both countries allow an industry for which minimizing animal welfare maximizes profit, to determine the standards and
methods for the animals’ treatment. 266 Brazil has acknowledged the need to
change this model but neither country has efficiently curbed rampant abuses
260
HSI FACT SHEET, supra note 245, at 1; see Brazilian Market, MINERVA FOODS,
http://ri.minervafoods.com/minerva2012/web/conteudo_en.asp?idioma=1&conta=44&tipo=40424
[http://perma.cc/LB53-RZJA] (last updated Jan. 21, 2014) (citing to data published by the United
States Department of Agriculture in May 2013).
261
See Brazil: Overview, WORLD BANK, http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/brazil/overview
[https://perma.cc/76BM-3GWX] (indicating through statistics and discussion that while there was
significant economic growth, many development indicators still demonstrate data of a developing
country). As of 2014, Brazil is the seventh largest economy in the world. WORLD BANK, GROSS
DOMESTIC PRODUCT 2014, at 1 (2015), http://databank.worldbank.org/data/download/GDP.pdf
[http://perma.cc/DZP3-KBP3]. The recession that gripped the country in 2015 bears further witness to the fragility of its economy. See Brazil’s Economy Enters Recession, BBC NEWS (Aug. 28,
2015), http://www.bbc.com/news/business-34088144 [perma.cc/MC3E-X24C].
262
See VAPNEK & CHAPMAN, supra note 140, at 3; Protests in Brazil: Taking to the Streets,
ECONOMIST (June 22, 2013), http://www.economist.com/news/americas/21579857-bubblinganger-about-high-prices-corruption-and-poor-public-services-boils-over [http://perma.cc/CAN8Q2NR] (discussing how a nine cent rise in bus fares sparked one of the biggest street demonstrations in Brazil since 1992); see also Paolo Winterstein, Brazil Real Has Further to Fall, WALL ST.
J., (Aug. 16, 2013, 4:26 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB1000142412788732345510457901
7022209075440 (discussing the steady decline in value of Brazilian currency and how easily Brazil’s economy is affected by declines in the U.S. economy).
263
See generally MINISTRY OF AGRIC., LIVESTOCK & FOOD SUPPLY, STRATEGIC PLAN
(2010), http://www.agricultura.gov.br/arq_editor/file/4039_strategic_plan_f.pdf [http://perma.cc/
D4DR-KKZA] (outlining Brazil’s agricultural management priorities).
264
MINISTRY OF AGRIC., LIVESTOCK & FOOD SUPPLY, supra note 162.
265
See supra notes 213–264 and accompanying text.
266
See supra notes 213–264 and accompanying text.
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within the industry. 267 Effective regulation and proper incentives to obey,
coupled with additional incentives to monitor, form the baseline for a regulatory regime that is sensitive to animal welfare. 268
We suggest that the best way to create such a regime is through the
formation of an independent regulatory agency devoted solely to animal
welfare in both the United States and Brazil. Such an agency would owe no
allegiance to the agricultural industry and would therefore be less vulnerable to agency capture. The next sections describe how such an Animal Welfare Agency would operate in the respective countries.
A. Animal Welfare Agency in the United States
An independent agency unaffiliated with or nested within any existing
agency or cabinet-level department would alleviate the pressure from the
agricultural lobby and the entrenchment of industry norms and end the consistent privileging of economics over animal welfare. Independent agencies
are not located directly within an executive department or within the executive branch. They are therefore insulated from political interests and pressures that might otherwise influence their actions. 269 These impartial agencies are “charged with the enforcement of no policy except the policy of the
law.” 270 This impartiality and focused implementation of the law provides a
useful foundation for addressing the systemic challenges of animal welfare. 271 The next sections describe how this agency, which we are tentatively naming the Animal Welfare Agency (“AWA”), might look if created in
the United States. 272
1. Structure to Ensure Independence
Every agency is created by an enabling statute, which establishes the
agency’s structure and purpose and delegates the necessary authority to effectuate that purpose. 273 The enabling statute also includes the necessary
267

See supra notes 213–264 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 273–326 and accompanying text.
269
Marshall J. Breger & Gary J. Edles, Established by Practice: The Theory and Operation of
Independent Federal Agencies, 52 ADMIN. L. REV. 1111, 1113 (2000); see also U.S. GOV’T PRINTING OFFICE, INDEPENDENT AGENCIES AND GOVERNMENT CORPORATIONS (n.d.), http://www.
gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/GPO-PLUMBOOK-2012/pdf/GPO-PLUMBOOK-2012-9.pdf [http://perma.cc/
LT7K-6C9V] (listing the following examples of independent agencies: Consumer Product Safety
Commission, Environmental Protection Agency, National Transportation Safety Board, Nuclear
Regulatory Commission).
270
Breger & Edles, supra note 269, at 1113.
271
See supra notes 213–264 and accompanying text (discussing challenges of current laws).
272
See infra notes 273–294 and accompanying text.
273
4 CHARLES H. KOCH, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PRACTICE § 11:13 (3d ed. 2015).
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information to establish the institutional structure and level of independence
of the agency. 274 The Animal Welfare Agency would require a strong enabling statute in order to effectively shift authority that has become wellentrenched elsewhere and to clearly establish the agency’s independence. 275
Traditionally, independent agencies are structured as multi-member
commissions with “for cause” removal protection. 276 “For cause” removal is
the most salient feature of American independent agencies, and is integral to
the ability to function without presidential oversight and pressure. 277 “For
cause” means that the agency head (or any Commissioner) cannot be removed at will. 278 That means that officials may only be removed for “inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office.” 279 Because independence
is vital to the AWA, for cause removal must be part of the AWA’s enabling
act. 280
Organizations structured in this manner “tend[] toward accommodation of diverse or extreme views through the compromise inherent in the
process of collegial decision-making,” thus leading to less politically biased
results. 281 Therefore, the enabling statute for the AWA should provide for an
agency led by a Commission of five to seven members, rather than a Director or Administrator. A Commission can better resist political pressures and
can make unpopular choices without fear of reprisal or backlash.282
274
See, for example, the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act, which provides authority to
the Food and Drug Administration. 21 U.S.C. §§ 301–399f (2012).
275
See supra notes 87–89 and accompanying text (discussing the self-regulation of the agriculture industry).
276
Rachel E. Barkow, Insulating Agencies: Avoiding Capture Through Institutional Design,
89 TEX. L. REV. 15, 16–17 (2010).
277
See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 410–11 (1989) (“[L]imitation on the President’s removal power . . . is specifically crafted to prevent the President from exercising ‘coercive
influence’ over independent agencies.”); see also Barkow, supra note 276, at 29 (“A removal
restriction undoubtedly gives an agency head greater confidence to challenge Presidential pressure.”).
278
See Barkow, supra note 276, at 27 (“Whether an agency head should be removable at will
or serve a term of years and be removable only for cause before his or her term expires is, as noted, the insulation design feature that is most often used to demarcate an agency as ‘independent.’”).
279
See 15 U.S.C. §§ 41, 2053 (2012); 42 U.S.C. §§ 5841(e), 7171(b)(1) (2012) (Nuclear Regulatory Commission and Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, respectively).
280
See supra note 277 and accompanying text.
281
Breger & Edles, supra note 269, at 1113.
282
See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 7171(b)(1). Section 7171(b)(1) offers an example of an independent
agency (Federal Energy Regulatory Commission) whose enabling act includes all of the previously discussed essential, independent structural elements. Id. The enabling act states:

The Commission shall be composed of five members appointed by the President, by
and with the advice and consent of the Senate. One of the members shall be designated by the President as Chairman. Members shall hold office for a term of 5 years
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Another important way to maintain agency independence and protect
against infiltration of presidential and private interests would involve including a provision limiting the number of Commissioners affiliated with
the President’s political party. 283 Such a provision would ensure fair political distribution, diminish partisan imbalance, and prevent skewed policy
objectives. For example, a Commission of five might include at least two
Commissioners that are members of a political party other than the President’s. A Commission of seven would have at least three members of a different party than the President. Commissioners must also have terms that
are longer than the President’s so as to ensure continuity and agency stability, and also to protect against the President appointing the entire Commission and thus controlling the agency’s allegiance. 284 Therefore, the AWA’s
Commissioners should have six-year staggered terms. This would ensure
that no one President dictates the AWA’s policy aims. It would also facilitate
the seamless accumulation of expertise. 285
2. Authority to Ensure Animal Welfare
In addition to providing an independent structure, the AWA’s enabling
statute must pronounce with clarity the purpose and authority vested in the
agency. The AWA’s mission should be the protection of all animals from
cruelty—including and indeed especially agricultural animals—from birth
until death. 286 The AWA must have the authority to regulate and ensure the
proper treatment and conditions of animals when they are young, as they
mature, during transport, and up to and during slaughter. 287 Unlike Brazil,
and may be removed by the President only for inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office. Not more than three members of the Commission shall be members of the same political party. Any Commissioner appointed to fill a vacancy occurring prior to the expiration of the term for which his predecessor was appointed
shall be appointed only for the remainder of such term.
Id. (emphasis added).
283
See Barkow, supra note 276, at 37–40.
284
Id. at 25.
285
See id. at 29 (citing S. REP. NO. 63-597, at 10–11 (1914) for the proposition that sevenyear terms of Federal Trade Commission Commissioners would “give them an opportunity to
acquire the expertness in dealing with these special questions concerning industry that comes from
experience”).
286
Factory Farms, ASPCA, https://www.aspca.org/animal-cruelty/factory-farms [perma.cc/
A3D9-LRF3] (noting that agricultural animals represent 99% of animals affected by humans).
287
Some would argue—with reason—that any welfare regime that allows and enables the
slaughter of animals is inherently flawed. See Rodriguez, supra note 193, at 58–59. However, we
are not here arguing for animal slaughter. We are simply stating that if there is to be an agricultural regime wherein animals are raised and killed, then that regime should be regulated to make the
animals’ lives as comfortable and cruelty-free as possible.
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the United States does not have a constitutional provision to guide the agency’s mandate. 288 And, as previously discussed, the United States has a woefully deficient regulatory regime that will require a number of statutory fixes. 289 Any new laws seeking to protect agricultural animals will almost certainly fail if they fall under the regulatory aegis of an agency that is overtaxed with respect to its resources and guided by a mission that conflicts
with animal welfare.290
One of the principal challenges facing the creation of the AWA lies with
the fact that the enabling statute must also take the form of a reorganization
statute. In other words, all existing statutory authority for animal welfare must
be re-delegated from existing agencies to the AWA. 291 This would involve
shifting regulatory authority mainly from the Department of Agriculture. 292
Statutes that implicate animal welfare likely will require amendment or a
comprehensive reorganization. 293 This reorganization would be onerous at
any time, but the current political climate, rife as it is with antagonism, mistrust, and gridlock, makes it harder still.
Another significant challenge exists with respect to preemption of state
laws. 294 Large agricultural interests will seek guarantees that complying
with federal regulations will excuse them from having to comply with the
many and varied state laws. Permitting preemption would, in the authors’
opinion, be a significant mistake as states may wish to lead on animal protection issues by enacting laws and regulations more progressive than those
passed at the federal level.
B. An Animal Welfare Agency in Brazil
Over the past twenty years, Brazil has developed its regulatory sector
to include numerous independent agencies that focus on everything from

288
See supra notes 146–178 and accompanying text (noting that Brazil’s regulations pertaining to animals used in agriculture conform to European Union standards, which are more rigorous
than those of the United States).
289
See supra notes 41–122 and accompanying text (demonstrating that authority for overseeing that regime, such as it is, should transfer to the AWA, as well).
290
See Barkow, supra note 276, at 21–24 (discussing potential problems with agency capture).
291
Animal Welfare Act of 1970, 7 U.S.C. §§ 2131–2159 (2012). For example, the Department of Agriculture’s Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service would no longer be responsible
for regulating animal welfare. Id.
292
Id.
293
Id.
294
See, e.g., Kerr v. Kimmell, 740 F. Supp. 1525, 1529–30 (D. Kan. 1990) (discussing a related issue of whether state law was preempted by the Animal Welfare Act).
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water allocation to electricity. 295 Given the proliferation of independent
agencies and the presence of the requisite political will, an Animal Welfare
Agency could also emerge. The Brazilian Animal Welfare Agency (“AWA”)
should be an independent agency because independent agencies can insulate
themselves from executive and political influence. 296 In the sections that
follow, we describe the institutional structure, delegated authority, and responsibilities that the AWA would be assigned. 297
1. Structure to Ensure Independence
Like the United States, Brazilian law requires an enabling statute to
create an independent agency. 298 This statute creates the agency, outlines its
structure, and delegates the necessary authority for it to function. 299 The
structural details found in the enabling act define the type of agency and its
degree of independence. In Brazil, the main factors that establish an agency
as independent include the selection method of agency officials, the type of
leadership, the term length of officials, the removal procedure for officials,
and the agency’s financial independence. 300
The AWA’s enabling statute must ensure that the agency’s structure accounts for and incorporates each of these factors, to avoid the political influence of the agricultural lobby and the primacy of political and economic
interests. 301 To do this, the statute must ensure that the Agency’s head officers are appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate. 302 Senate
confirmation checks the President’s ability to simply appoint individuals
295

See Mariana Mota Prado, The Challenges and Risks of Creating Independent Regulatory
Agencies: A Cautionary Tale from Brazil, 41 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 435, 443–47 (2008).
296
See CONSTITUIÇÃO FEDERAL [C.F.] [CONSTITUTION] art. 225 (Braz.).
297
See infra notes 298–326 and accompanying text.
298
See, e.g., Medida Provisória No. 2.228-1, de 6 de Setembro de 2001, DIÁRIO OFICIAL DA
UNIÃO [D.O.U.] de 10.09.2001 (Braz.) (establishing the Agência Nacional do Cinema); Lei No.
10.233, de 5 de Junho de 2001, DIÁRIO OFICIAL DA UNIÃO [D.O.U.] de 06.06.2001 (Braz.)
(establishing Agência Nacional de Transportes Aquaviários and Agência Nacional de Transportes
Terrestres); Lei No. 9.961, de 28 de Janeiro de 2000, DIÁRIO OFICIAL DA UNIÃO [D.O.U.] de
28.01.2000 (Braz.) (establishing Agência Nacional de Saúde Suplementar); Lei No. 9.782, de 26
de Janeiro de 1999, DIÁRIO OFICIAL DA UNIÃO [D.O.U.] de 27.01.1999 (Braz.) (establishing
Agência Nacional de Vigilância Sanitária); Lei No. 9.478, de 6 de Agosto de 1997, DIÁRIO
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who echo a particular political viewpoint or agenda. 303 This procedure is
already commonplace for independent agencies in Brazil. 304 As in the United States, a Commission made up of five to seven members provides for
greater independence because, unlike a single Director or Minister, the President is less likely to convince all Commissioners to pursue a specific goal
or agenda. 305
In addition to mandating the commission structure, the enabling statute
should also prevent the appointment of all Commissioners from the same
party. Partisan balance is more challenging in Brazil than in the United
States because Brazil has a multi-party system. 306 With so many parties represented in the federal government, it would be difficult to ensure that all
are represented on a panel of five to seven Commissioners. Therefore, the
best option may involve requiring that no more than two Commissioners be
from the President’s party with the rest coming from various other factions.
Furthermore, given the strong agricultural industry forces, Commissioners
should not have business or economic interests related to the work or business undertaken by the AWA. 307 This categorical bar would include an exception for veterinarians and those engaged in non-profit work that clearly
focuses on animal welfare.
The terms of the Commissioners should be staggered and exceed four
years (the presidential term length). 308 This way, no single President can
control the agency and its policies. And, because Commissioners’ terms
outlive the presidential term, there is more incentive to pursue sound, nonpolitically influenced policies. 309 In addition, Commissioners should be only removable for cause. 310 This type of agency structure is not uncommon
in Brazil. For example, the National Water Agency’s enabling statute allows
303
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at will removal only for the first four months of a Director’s term. 311 After
that, removal must be for cause. 312
Finally, the agency must be financially independent. If the President or
Congress alone can withhold funding when unhappy with the agency’s decisions or policies, then the agency is no longer insulated from political maneuvering. However, Brazilian agencies do often acquire some measure of
financial autonomy when their enabling statutes stipulate that funding come
predominantly from fees and fines collected by the agencies and that those
fees be used only for their respective regulatory agendas. 313 In practice, this
may be difficult to achieve, as the President has authority over appropriations and budgets, even those derived from independent sources (i.e., the
agency’s own revenue). 314 This hurdle cannot be defeated by any enabling
statute and presents an ongoing struggle for the Brazilian regulatory state. 315
2. Authority to Ensure Animal Welfare
Beyond its independent structure, the AWA must also have a purpose
and significant authority to serve that purpose. As with the AWA in United
States, the Brazilian AWA’s mission should be to safeguard animals against
cruelty from birth until death. The enabling statute must delegate significant
authority to serve that purpose. Fortunately, unlike in the United States,
there is an explicit constitutional mandate that the government protect animal welfare. 316 The AWA must have the authority not only to enforce violations of the Constitution, but also to enforce all federal legislation and existing regulation that supports that constitutional mandate and involves the
protection of animal welfare.317 Ultimately, all legal mechanisms that currently exist within Permanent Technical Commission on Animal Welfare
and other agencies must be aggregated and consolidated into the AWA.
The benefit of a clear mission focusing solely on animals without regard to agricultural interests, economic interests, and transnational business
interests, is that each phase of the animal’s life can be governed by consistent standards. The AWA’s independence and clarity of mission (i.e., pro311
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tection of animals from cruelty) would further ensure that existing legislative and constitutional goals for prevention of animal cruelty were successfully served. The agency’s mandate would also provide a strong foundation
from which to improve standards across the board.
C. Benefits of an Independent Agency for Animal Welfare
An agency whose mission is solely animal welfare could have an immediate and beneficial effect. The enabling statute would give it regulatory
authority and a mandate to ease the lives of billions of animals whose current existence is nothing short of gruesome. 318 What follows are just a few
examples of how it might operate.
First, the AWA could review current farming practices to determine if
the industry’s chosen methods cause needless suffering. Under the current
regulatory regime, necessity (when it is even considered) is determined with
respect to the economic gains such methods produce. 319 The AWA would
prioritize the animal’s experience.
Thus, for example, even if docking pigs’ tails enables them to be
penned in closer quarters, leading to more pigs per square foot and more
profit, the AWA would consider the impact of this procedure on the pig and
analyze whether it is necessary to the functioning of the industry. 320 Among
the things the agency might consider would be the current mortality rate at
industrial facilities, the mortality rate if the animals were given more space,
scientific data regarding the natural habits of the animals, and, of course,
whether docking tails causes the pigs to suffer. 321 The conclusion would
almost certainly be that the animals require more space and that taildocking causes needless suffering. 322
Second, the AWA could enable improved prosecutorial capability and
encourage public involvement. This new agency could welcome evidence
318
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[http://perma.cc/J9L5-M5P5]; Marc Bracke et al., Attitudes of Dutch Pig Farmers Towards Tail
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of animal welfare violations from animal advocates and encourage individuals to provide evidence to law enforcement. 323 Currently, in both the United States and Brazil, the prosecutor is often overburdened with other cases
and sometimes politically tied to the interest of the industry, and, thus, enforcement seldom occurs. 324 A federal agency dedicated to the protection of
animal welfare would entrench norms that could then permeate into the federal, state, and local regimes.
Third, because the AWA—rather than the entire agricultural industry—will regulate agricultural animal welfare, the agency can play a key
role in providing expertise, investigation, and information that would more
objectively design or contribute to the industry’s operation in a way that
protects animals from mistreatment. This is similar to the impacts of other
federal statutes and agencies. For example, the Energy Policy and Conservation Act regulates mileage standards for the auto industry, forcing technological upgrades as well as impacting manufacturing choices.325 With respect to the AWA, the statute could give the agency authority to influence
industry choices through tax credits for purchases of equipment that promote humane treatment. 326
The foregoing offer just a few of the many ways that the AWA could
improve agricultural animal welfare—as well as animal welfare as it pertains to all animals—in two of the world’s largest economies, the United
States and Brazil. If either or both countries were to create such agencies,
and new and effective welfare standards were to result, that would combine
with the European Union’s existing regulations to reduce the suffering quotient of billions of the world’s animals.
CONCLUSION
The foregoing analysis demonstrates that while each country has a different statutory and regulatory regime, both countries arrive at a similar re323
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sult: widespread mistreatment of agricultural animals. The United States
lacks statutes that adequately address animal welfare. The few laws that do
address animal treatment are plagued with exemptions, are not regulated
and enforced, or are more concerned with the animal once it is dead. Brazil,
on the other hand, has several statutes prohibiting cruelty towards animals
and, more importantly, a constitutional provision that explicitly recognizes
fundamental rights for animals. 327 Yet despite these protections, Brazilian
agricultural animals continue to suffer due to inadequate enforcement and
widespread mistreatment.
The process toward a more humane agricultural animal treatment regime requires two steps. First, a statutory regime must be in place that defines and outlines the scope of animal welfare and the protections owed to
animals. Second, there must be an effective method to implement the legal
protections provided in step one. The United States is at step one; the government has yet to develop and enact legislation or regulations that sufficiently protect agricultural animals. Brazil has significant work to do for
step one; European Union standards are present in Brazil, but are voluntary
while statutes prohibiting animal cruelty are rarely prosecuted. Brazil is also
struggling with step two, as it lacks an effective way to enforce the statutory
and constitutional legal protections already in place.
An agency whose principal mission is animal welfare enables the necessary regulations to overcome step one and also dissolve the obstacles that
plague step two. We have no illusions that the “solution” offered herein is
simple, easy, or final. However, it does provide a step in the right direction,
a step toward recognition that animal lives matter—whether they be pets or
livestock. It would further require ongoing scrutiny of industry practices
with the lives and well-being on the animals at the forefront of the analysis.
Of course, this agency will not eliminate cruelty. It would rather mark
the beginning of a long overdue domestic and international conversation
about the importance of animal welfare. That conversation would perhaps
mark the beginning of an equally overdue conversation about the nature of
our relationship with the nonhuman world. We look forward to both. As T.S.
Eliot once said, “HURRY UP PLEASE IT’S TIME.” 328
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